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INTRODUCTION
"This is a temporary, stopgap measure that lets us focus our
resources wisely while giving a degree of relief and hope to
talented, driven, patriotic young people . . .

it's the right

thing to do."' On June 15, 2012, the Obama administration

1. Barak Obaia, President, United States of America, Speech on Immigratinon

Delivered

from

the White

House Rose Garden

(june

15,

2012),

available at
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initiated a new policy in immigration enforcement, providing
temporary relief from deportation to 800,000 individuals
without lawful immigration status who came to the United States
as children. 2 This policy, known as Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals ("DACA"), defers removal action for two
years and provides individuals with work authorization if they
meet other eligibility criteria for eligibility. Prior to the
implementation of this policy, Congress failed to pass an
immigration reform bill, known as the Development, Relief, and
Education for Alien Minors ("DREAM") Act.4 The DREAM Act
addressed, among other aspects of immigration, this specific
group of undocumented immigrants.5
The executive branch implemented DACA through the
exercise of categorical, or macro-level, prosecutorial discretion.
http:
nytimes. con/ 2012/ 0 6/ 16/us/ transcript-of-obam as-speech-onimmigration-policy.htmi [President Obania, Speech on Immigration].
2. Julia Preston & john Cushman, jr., Obana to Permit Young Wigrants To Remain in
US., N.Y. TIMES, june 15, 2012, at Al, availableat http:/,/mT.nytimes.com/2012/06/
16/ us/us-to-stop-deporting-some -illegal-inimigrants.htmil ("Hundreds of thousands of
illegal immigrants wvho came to the United States as children wvill be allowed to remain
in the country without fear of deportation .... "); see Obama, supra note 1 (explaining
the framework of this new enforcement policy and who is eligible for deportation
relief).
3. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Scc'y of Homeland Sec., Dep't of
Homeland Sec., on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals
Who Came Here as Children to David Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs and
Border Patrol, Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Scrvs., John
Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (June 15, 2012)
[hereinafter Napolitano, DACA Memorandum], available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/s1-exercing-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-caie-to-usas-children.pdf (explaining Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ("DA(A"), who
will be eligible for relief from deportation, and the inability for DACA to grant legal
status); Preston & Cushman, supra note 2 (discussing the parameters of DA(A and its
potential renewal after two years).
4. Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2010, S. 3992,
111th Cong. (2010).
5. Id. 4(a) (detailing a policy of canceling the removal of aliens "prescnt in the
United States for a continuous period of not less than 5 years immediately preceding
the date of the cnactncnt of this Act and was younger than 16 years of age on the date
the alien initially entered the United States ... ."); see 156 CONG. REC. S8662-01 (Daily
ed. Dec. 9, 2010) (tabling the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act
("DREAM") Act in the Scnate for later consideration aftr its passage in the House).
6. Compare Napolitano. DA(A Memorandum. supa note 3 (discussing the broad
category of individuals eligible for relief under DACA based on their circumstances of
arrival and time in the United States), with HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION POLICY
CTR., PROSECUTORAL DISCRETION IN CONTXT: Ho,w DISCRETION Is EXERCISLD
THROUGHOUT OUR IMMIGRATION SYSTEMI 2 (2012),

avaiabl

at http:/,/mmyT~.ilw.comn/
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Prosecutorial discretion is the ability of law enforcement
agencies to make discretionary decisions about whether a law
should be enforced against a particular individual or category of
individuals. 7 Agents may make discretionary decisions in the
context of criminal law enforcement, or civilly when deciding
whether to remove undocumented immigrants from the United
States.8
Opposition from Republicans, state governments, and
agents within the Department of Homeland Security followed
the announcement of DACA. 9 Some criticize the Obama
administration for creating through executive action what
Congress had failed to pass through the legislative process."o
Specifically, critics dub DACA an administrative "end run
around Congress" to create immigration reform. 11 Others
suggest President Obama has stepped outside the bounds of
articles/2012,0516-motomnu ra.pdf (defining categorical macro-level and individualized
micro-level prosecutorial discretion).
7. See KATE M. MANUEL & TODD GARVEY, CONGR. RESEARCH SFRVT., R42924,
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRLTION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMLNT: LLGAL ISSULS 1 (2013)

(explaining prosecutorial discretion); see also 8 U.S.C.
1103(a) (1) (2012) (charging
the Secretary of Homeland Security with the administration of immigration law).
8. See Joseph Landau, DOAA and Presidential Discretion: Interpretingand Enforcing
Federal Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 619, 633 (2012) (discussing how prosecutorial
discretion is intrinsic to criminal law, but also widely exercised by the executive branch
in immigration law enforcement); Wadhia, ProsecutorialDiscretion, supra note al. at 244
(explaining the different contexts in which prosecutorial discretion is exercised).
9. See Press Release, Office of the Gov. Rick Perry, Statement by Governor Perry
on Obama Administration's Immigration Announcement (June 15, 2012), available at
http://governor.state.tx.us/newvs/press-release/17344/
("This Administration has
failed to provide a secure border. which is essential to national security, and is instead
granting blanket amnesty to those who have broken our laws."); Brian Tashman, AntiImmnigrant Leader Kris Kobach Leves Dishonest Attacks on Obama Imnmigration Directive,
RIGHT WING WATCH (Aug. 31, 2012, 2:25 PM), http://wNT.rightwingatch.org/
content/anti-inmmigrant-leader-kris-kobach-levels-dishonest-attacks-obama-imnmigrationdirective (discussing Kris Kobach's opposition to DACA because it forces immigration
agents and administrative officials to break the law and allows illegal immigrants to stay
in the United States).
10. Tashman, supra note 9 (discussing the failed passage of the DREAM Act and
the Obama Administration's circumvention of Congress in violation of the separation
of powers); see Preston & Cushman. supra note 2 (explaining that the group of
immigrants benefitting from DACA is similar to those that would have benefitted from
the DREAM Act).
11. Preston & Cushman. supra note 2 (explaining how Republicans reacted
angrily to DACA and view the policy as an end-run around Congress); see Tashman,
supra note 9 ("The DREAM Act has been proposed in Congress 24 times in the last 11
years, it never passed and yet this administration thinks it can just circuivent Congress
and that violates our constitutional separation of powvers.").
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appropriate executive power.1 2 Finally, Republican critics fear
that DACA will result in added costs to American citizens,
specifically in job competition, crime, and education and
healthcare expenses. 3
The state and agency response to DACA begs the question:
Should categorical prosecutorial discretion continue to be
exercised in the same way as it was in DACA to grant large
groups of undocumented immigrants relief from deportation?
The backlash to DACA may indicate that categorical
prosecutorial discretion should be altered, when the category of
potential beneficiaries and perceived breadth of the policy is
expansive, to avoid similar responses in the future. 4
Perceptions of DACA's scope and its potential for
encroachment on state law has prompted some states to define
DACA recipients as unlawfully present in the United States, as
opposed to simply being in the United States without lawful
status.15 By defining DACA recipients in this way, these states

12. See Tashman, supra note 9 ("[T]his administration thinks it can just
circumvent Congress and that violates our constitutional separation of powers.");
Robert Delahunty & John Yoo, The Obamia Administration, the DRLEM Act and the Take
Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. RLV. 781 (2013) (theorizing that claims of a broad power of
prosecutorial discretion run counter to the Take Care Clause).

13. See Elizabeth Llorinte, MWitt Romney's UTnofficial Advisor Confident About
humigration Lawsuit, Fox NEWS (Oct. 11, 2012), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/
politics/2012/ 10/11 /misissippi-joins-lawvsuit-against-obana-p 1rograrn-fordreamers (exploring the potential for criminal and healthcare costs due to DA(A):
Anna Fifield & Martha Shanahan, YoungInmigrants HailDeportationReprieve, FIN. TIMES
(London) (Aug. 15, 2012), http://wN.ft.con/intl/cns/s/0/d6272400-e613-Ilel8a74-00144feab49a.htmi (discussing how "potentially millions of illegal immigrants will
be permitted to compete with Ameirican workers for scarce jobs").
14. See MANUEL & GARVEY, supra note 7, at 16-17 (2013) (discussing the scope of
DA(A and the number of individuals categorically selected as potentially overstepping
bounds of executive); see also supra notes 9-13 and accompanying tcxt (explaining
opposition and criticism of DACA).

15 . See, e.g., Ariz. Exec. Order. No. 2012-06
(Aug. 15,
2012),
http://ww.azsos.gov/publicSciices/Register/2012/36/governor.pdf
[hereinafter
Brewer, Executive Order], (stating DACA does not provide sate benefits to DACA
recipicnts, and the intent of Arizona lawmakers and voters was not to give driver's
licenses to these unlawfully present individuals); Miss. Exec. Order No. 1299 (Aug. 22,
2012)
[hereinafter
Bryant,
Executive
Order],
available
at
http://www.governorbiryant.col/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Executivc-Order1299.pdf (viewing DA(A recipicnts as unlawfully present and explaining states do not
have to grant benefits to unlawlidly present aliens).
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refuse to convey public benefits, chiefly in the form of driver's
license, to these individuals living within their borders.16
Additional opposition to DACA has come from
Immigration and
Customs Enforcement
("ICE"), the
immigration law enforcement branch of the Department of
Homeland Security. Concerned about implementing DACA in
the field, ICE agents and the State of Mississippi filed suit over
the legality of DACA as an act of prosecutorial discretion.18
This Note examines the executive branch's macro-level and
micro-level approaches to exercising prosecutorial discretion to
grant discretionary relief to undocumented immigrants illegally
present in the United States. Specifically, it explores DACA as an
exercise of categorical prosecutorial discretion and the state and
agency backlash to this enforcement policy. Then, it compares
Canada's preference for individualized, case-by-case exercise of
prosecutorial discretion for relief from immigration law. In
Canada, the case-by-case resolutions of claims for discretionary
relief and a different framework for immigration policy avoids
the tensions presented by DACA.
Part I explores the background of prosecutorial discretion
in the United States. This Part provides a general history of
prosecutorial discretion, both in the criminal and immigration
systems. Finally, this Part explores the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in Canada. Next, Part II explores the advantages and
disadvantages of using categorical prosecutorial discretion in
American immigration law through the lens of DACA, and
dissects the state and agency backlash to this systemic policy.
16. Compare Napolitano, DACA Mernorandurn, supra note 3, at 3 (explaining that
DACA "confers no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship" to
beneficiaries of the policy), with Jonathan Oosting, Michigan Innigrants Rally at Capitol,
Seeking Driver's Licenses for Those Allowed to Iork, MLIVE (Nov. 10, 2012),
http://www.live.com/news/index.ssf/2012/ 11/michigan immigrants-rallyat
s.html (noting the Michigan Secretary of State's interpretation DA(A beneficiaries as
unlawfiully present, as opposed to having unlawlul status, and therefore ineligible for
driver's licenses).

17. See Napolitano, DA(A Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2-3 (discussing how
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, along with US Citizenship and
immigration Services agents, are tasked with implementing DA(A); see also Amended
Complaint at 1. Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247-0 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 10 2012),
available at https://www.numbersusa.com/content/iles,/Amended Complaint.pdf
(explaining the grounds for this action against the Department of Homeland Security).
18. See Amended Complaint, supra note 17, at 1-2 (introducing the parties and
grounds of the lawsuit).
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Part II then compares the advantages and disadvantages of
Canada's adherence to individualized, micro-level prosecutorial
discretion as the primary means for effectuating discretionary
relief. Finally, Part III offers recommendations for the future use
of categorical prosecutorial discretion in American immigration.
These recommendations aim to avoid negative state and agency
reactions to future executive policies providing for discretionary
relief from deportation to large groups of similarly situated
individuals.
I. THE UADERPINAIGS OFPROSECUTORIAL DISCRETIONT
Part I explains prosecutorial discretion generally and its
place in the immigration enforcement sector of the executive
branch. Part LA presents a brief history of this practice and its
origins in the criminal justice system. Next, Part LB discusses
prosecutorial discretion in immigration law through DACA, and
explains the Supreme Court rhetoric about prosecutorial
discretion in Arizona v. United States. 9 Finally, Part LC explores
the use of micro-level prosecutorial discretion as the primary
means for discretionary relief in Canadian immigration.
A. What is ProsecutorialDiscretion?
In general, prosecutorial discretion is a power inherent in
law enforcement, allowing officials to use discretion when
implementing broad statutes passed by the legislature and
entrusted to the executive for implementation.2o Prosecutorial
discretion allows the executive branch, or certain law

19. Arizonav. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
20. See Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Conm'r of Immigration and
Naturalization Servs. on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion (Nov. 17, 2000)
[hereinafter
Meissner
Memorandum].
available
at
http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.u/refereincc/additional-miaterials/immigration/
enforcement-detention-and-crimina-justice/govern ment-documents/ 22092970-INS(tidance-Memo -Prosecutorial-Discretion-Doris-Mcissner-I 11-7-00.pdf/view
("'Prosecutorial discretion' is the authority of an agency charged with enforcing a law
to decide whether to enforce, or not to enforce, the law against someone."); Wadhia,
ProsecutorialDiscretion, supra note al, at 246 (explaining how prosecutorial discretion
allows each law enforcement agency to decide whether to use its enforcement power
against someone).
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enforcement officials, to determine how best to enforce the law,
while meeting administrative goals and conserving resources. 1
Historically, prosecutorial discretion was exercised by
criminal prosecutors, and later developed within the context of
immigration. Since the 1930s, prosecutorial discretion has
been recognized in the criminal justice system.23 In this system,
police officers and prosecutors exercise discretion when
deciding to arrest, prosecute, and charge individuals with
violations of the law. 24 Similarly, immigration officials also
exercise prosecutorial discretion in the context of immigration
enforcement.
From a US Constitution standpoint, the power to exercise
prosecutorial discretion falls within the confines of the
separation of powers doctrine, and is considered a valid exercise

21. See IMMIGRATION & (UHSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, TOOL.KIT FOR PROSFCUTORS 2
(2011) [hereinafter TOOLKIT FOR PROSECUTORS], available at http://Nw.ice.gov/

doclib/about/offices/osltc/pdf/tool-kit-for-prosecutors.pdf
(explaining
how
prosecutors and other government agents can use such discretion as a tool to meet
various ends); see also Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine
11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 781. 795-96 (2009) (explaining the president's constitutional
role to enforce the laws effectuated by the discretionary decision making of executive
agencies).
22. See KATL M. MANUEL & TODD GARVEY, CONGR. R-ESLARCH SLRV.. R42924,
PROSECU TORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: LEtGAl IsSUEs. 8, 10
(2013) (discussing the roots of prosecutorial discretion in criminal prosecution dating
back to English comnion law and its later application to immigration law
enforcement); Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of ProsecutorialD-setion in Federal Law:

Origins and Development, 6 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 1, 19 (2009) (discussing the
origins of prosecutorial discretion in criminal prosecution).
23 . See joan E. Jacoby, The American Prosecutor's Disceonary Power. 31
PROSECU TOR 25, 39 (Dec. 1997) (noting how the Wikershan Commission recognized
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the criminal justice system as early as the
1930s); Wadhia, ProsecutorialDiscretion, supra note al, at 266 (citing the Wickersham
Commission's recognition of prosecutorial discretion in the 1930s).
24. SeeWadhia, ProsecutorialDiscretion, supranotc al, at 267 (discussing the federal
prosecutor's ability to use discretion); see also Krauss, supra note 21, at 4 (quoting
Kenneth Culp Davis' criticism of the wide latitude of "unnecessary discretionary power
over individual partics" given to police and prosecutors).
25. See MANUEL & GARVEY, supra note 7, at 1 (explaining how prosecutorial

discretion is recognized as exercised outside of prosecution to include the enforcemcnt
decisions of immigration officials); see also IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., UNDLRSTANDING
PROSECU TORIAL
DISCRETION
IN
IMMIGRATION
LAW
(May
26,
2011),
http://ww. inimigrationpolicy .org/just-facts/ understanding-prosecutorial-discretionimmnigration-law (explaining prosecutorial discretion is recognizing in the enforcement

decisions of the sub-agencies within the Department of Homeland Security).
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of the executive branch's Article 11 powers. 2 AIticle II of the US
Constitution provides that the President is vested with the power
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 2 The
Supreme Court has held that executive decisions to enforce the
law, and the use of executive orders to guide uniformity in
agency interpretation and enforcement of a statute, are
appropriate constructions of the executive branch's Article II
powers.28
Exercises of prosecutorial discretion may still be subject to
limitations by the other government branches.29 Because the
executive branch is implementing legislation when making
discretionary decisions about enforcement, Congress may
mandate the specific mode of executive enforcement for a
specific law. * Generally, judicial review of prosecutorial
discretion is limited because the executive branch, not the
judiciary, is thought to be the best suited to decide how to
effectively enforce the law and allocate agency resources. In

26. See U.S. CONST. art. II, 3; see also Krauss, supra note 21, at I1-12 (discussing
the executive branch's use of prosecutorial discretion as part of the "Take Care" Clause
of the Constitution): MANUEL & GARVEY, supra note 7, at 16 (explaining the authority
to exercise prosecutorial discretion in immigration context arises from the US
Constitution).

27. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3: Grove, supra note 20, at 795-96 (noting the
executive branch's Article II powers includes the duty to see federal law obeved
requiring a considerable degree of prosecutorial discretion).
28. See Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985) (explaining that the
executive branch is tasked with implementing certain laws and has certain expertise to
exercise discretion when enforcing these laws); see also Jack Goldsmith & John F.
Manning, The President's Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280. 2294-97 (2006)
(describing how this is a proper executive lunction); MANUEL & GARVEY, supra note 7,
at 8 (discussing how courts characterize prosecutorial discretion as a mixture of
separation of powers and Article 11 doctrine, and a necessary executive function to
administer

justice).

29. See Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 27, at 2295 (discussing congressional
oversight to acts of executive enforcement of law); see also Grove, supra note 20, at 800
("Executive enforcement decisions are subject to congressional oversight.").
30. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (noting that Congress may be
explicit about how the US executive branch should implement a law); see also MANULL
& GARVEY, supra note 7, at 4-5 (explaining how some view immigration law as
delegated to the executive branch while others believe Congress and the executive
share plenary power).
31. See MANUEL & GARVEY, supra note 7, at 8-9 (discussing the executive's duty to
enforce the legislature's laws which allows exclusive executive authority to enforce and
prosecute under these laws); see also Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 27, at 2294-95;

Andrew 1. Loewenstein, JudicialReview and the Limits ofProsecu orial Discretion, 38 AM.
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the specific context of immigration law, the Court has similarly
deferred to the discretionary decision-making of the executive
branch, leaving this task to the executive branch and Congress) 2
B. Prosecutorial Discretion in American Immigration
As in the criminal law context, prosecutorial discretion in
immigration law allows executive branch officials to decline to
enforce the full power of a law against a particular individual or
group. 3 Prosecutorial discretion in immigration can be
exercised both categorically and individually. 3 Categorical, or
macro-level prosecutorial discretion is a discretionary decision to
adopt a systemic agency policy that grants relief from
enforcement to categories of similarly situated individuals.35
DACA seems to be a clear example of prosecutorial discretion at
the categorical level, as the executive branch chose to develop a
systemic plan to defer removal action for an entire class of
CRIM. L. RLV. 351, 366-67 (" [T]his 'broad discretion' rests largely on the recognition
that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill suited tojudicial review.").
32. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comin., 525 U.S. 471, 490
(1999) (explaining how judicial deference to prosecutorial discretion in immigration
deportation decisions should be even greater than in criminal proceedings); MANIL l
& GARVEY, supra note 6, at 6, 9 (explaining courts do not require specific statutory
authorization for acts of prosecutorial discretion in immigration and treat these
enforcement decisions with as much deference as discretionary decisions by criminal
prosecutors); see generally Cristina M. Rodriguez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case
of Executive Control Over Immigration Policy, 59 DUiKL L.J. 1787, 1803-10 (2010)
(discussing how Congress, the President, and the bureaucracy are the parties
responsible for making policy decisions in immigration law, and the advantages each
party has in making these decisions).
33. See Landau, supra note 7, at 632 ("Prosecutorial discretion ... concerns the
authority of the immigration enforcement arm of the executive branch not to assert
the full scope of is powers of enforcnement in an individual case or category of cas")
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharng Secrets: Examning Deferred Action and Trsparenc in
lmnigration Law, 10 U. N.H. L REV. 1, 6 (2012) [hereinafter Wadhia, Sharing Sc,rets]
(explaining how favorable exercises of prosecutorial discretion allows the Department
of Homeland Security to not assert the full scope of enforcement authority in every
case and may depend on economic and humanitarian factors),
34. See Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note al, at 246 ("Pros cutorial
discretion is applied at both a categorical and an individual level."); see also
MOTOMURA, supra non 6, at 2 (explaining macro-level and micro-level prosecutorial
discretion).

35. See MOTOMU RA, supra note 6, at 2 (noting categorical prosecutorial discretion
is systemic and grants relief to groups); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary
Deportation, 20 GLO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611. 623 (2006) (discussing the executive branch's
authority to identify categories of cases for discretionary relief from removal).
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individuals. 6 Discretionary relief may also be granted on an
individualized basis, known as micro-level prosecutorial
discretion.3 Micro-level prosecutorial discretion is the decision
to enforce, or not to enforce, the law to its fullest extent against
a specific individual.I
Despite the conceptual differences between these
approaches to prosecutorial discretion, immigration officials
have been granting discretionary relief from deportation to
immigrants prior to the formal recognition of this practice in
the mid-1970s. 3 Within the agency then responsible for
immigration, Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS),
administrative officials granted case-by-case relief from
deportation if an undocumented immigrant, or the immigrant's
family, would face extreme hardship or injustice by the
removal. 4o However, in 1975 the INS formally recognized
prosecutorial discretion by acknowledging its long-time nonpriority program.41 The INS non-priority program deferred

36. Compare Napolitano, DACA Memorandum, supra note 3 (citing the criteria of
DACA that defines a category of similarly situated individuals afforded discretionary
relief from deportation under this enforcecmnt priority), with MOTOMURA, supra note
6, at 2 (explaining categorical prosecutorial discretion and how it differs from
individualized prosecutorial discretion).
37. See MOTOMURA, supra note 6, at 2 (describing macro-level prosecutorial
discretion); Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note al, at 246 (explaining that
prosecutorial discretion may be exercised categorically and individually).
38. See MOTOMURA, supra note 6, at 2 ("Micro-lcvcl discretion involves decisions
to proceed-or not to proceed-against identified individuals."); Wadhia, Prosecutorial
Discretion, supra note al, at 246 (describing the two forms of discretionary relief as
categorical and individualized).
39. See generally Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Inmigration
Restriction and Deportation, 1921-1965, 21 LAW\ & HIST. REV. 69 (2003) (examining
deportation policy and discretionary relic friom 1921 through 1965, including a call for
more administrative discretion in deportation decision-making during the New Deal
cra); see also Neuman, supra note 34, at 622-23 (recognizing the existence of
administrative discretion prior to, and in, the 1940s).
40. See Ngai, supra note 39, at 99 (discussing how discretionary relief would be
granted in "meritorious" cases to avoid the extreme hardship and injustice of the
rigid" immigration laws): see also Neuman, supra note 35, at 622-23 (noting that US
statutory law" allows discretionarv relief in cases of hardship or injustice).
41. See Memorandum from Andorra Briuno et al., Specialist in Immigration Pol'y,
Cong. Research Serv. to Multiple Cong. Requesters, at 8 (July 13. 2012), available at
http://www.edsource.org/today,/wvp-content/uploads/I)eferred-ActionBruno Mcmoriandum]
[hereinafter
Congressional-Rcsearch-Seivice-Rcport.pdf
(offering guidance for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion where an individual

presented appealing humanitarian factors wvere present); see also Wadhia,. Prosectorial
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action for an individual undocumented immigrant who
exhibited certain appealing humanitarian circumstances.4 2
Following the INS's recognition of the non-priority
program of the 1970s, the agency began to provide agents with
official guidance on the proper exercise of prosecutorial
discretion.43 Significantly, a 2000 memorandum from former
INS Commissioner Doris Meissner provided concrete guidelines
on the use of prosecutorial discretion.44 These guidelines listed
situations and various factors an immigration agent should
consider to determine the "totality of the circumstances" of an
individual case before initiating removal proceedings.45
Since the issuance of the Meissner memorandum, the
Department of Homeland Security has continued to issue
guidance, emphasizing the use of discretion to avoid
deportation for humanitarian reasons, and deprioritizing
individuals for removal by ICE agents. 46 These memoranda
Discretion, supra note al, at 248 (listing factors that the INS considered when
detcrimining if action should be deferred and if an individual was a non-priority).
42. See Wadhia, Pros ecutialDicretion,supra note al, at 248 (citing advanced or
tender age, ycar's present in the United States, physical or mental condition requiring
care in the United States, family situation in the United States, and criminal or
immoral activities and affiliations as factors Immigration andNaturalization Service
("INS") agents considered when granting deferred action at this time); see also Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Morton Meno and ProsecutorialDiscretion, AM. INIMICR. COUN. 3
(2011) [hereinalter Wadhia, Morton Memo], available at http://wwv.ilw.com/articles/
2011,0805-Wadhia.pdf (discussing histoly of individualized discretionary relief within
immigration agencies).
43. See, e.g:, Bruno Memorandum, supra note 40, at 6 ("Over the next few
decades, an official guidance on discretionary relief fron removal began to take
shape."); Meissner Memorandum, supra note 19 (explaining prosecutorial discretion
and the guidelines for enforcing it).
44. See Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note al. at 255 (discussing the
guidance given to immigration officials by thee Meissner memorlandum on exercising
discretion); see also Meissner Memorandum, supra note 19 (offering guidance for Held
agents making decisions about undoctumcnted immigrants).
45. See Wadhia, ProsecutorialDiscretion, supra note al, at 255 (stating an INS field
officer may look to the immigration status, length of residence in the United States,
criminal history, humanitarian concerns, immigration history, likelihood of ultimate
removal of the alien, likelihood of achieving enforcement goal by another mcans.
whether the alien is or could be eligible for relief, the effect of action on future
admissibility, current or past cooperation with law enforcement, honorable military
service,

community

attention, and

INS's

resources,

when

deciding

to

enforce

immigration law); see also Meissner Memorandum, supra note 20 (listing the factors an
immigration should consider when exercising prosecutorial discretion).
46. See Memorandum from Bo Cooper, General Counsel. Immigration and
Naturalization Servs., I)ep't of justice, to all Offce of the Principle Legal Adviser Chief
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urged immigration officials at all stations of the removal process
to exercise prosecutorial discretion. 4 After the Meissner
memorandum, subsequent memoranda instructed immigration
officials to defer removal action if an individual displayed
sympathetic humanitarian factors.48 The guidelines in these
memoranda were broad and left agents to decide who would be
eligible for relief.49 They also reminded immigration officials of
their ability to exercise discretion, as not all cases can and
should be prosecuted to the fullest extent under the law.5o
Two recent memoranda added to the Meissner progeny.'
These documents, issued by ICE Director John Morton, listed
Counsel July 11, 2000) (on ile with author) (offering further information on
prosecutorial discretion to guide INS agents' in the exercise this authority after the
issuance of the Meissner memorandum'); Memorandum from William J. Howard,
Principal Legal Advisor, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to all OPLA Chief
Counsel (Oct. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Howard Memorandum] (on file with author)
(offering further guidance on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and its
continued importance, after the Meissner memorandum).
47. See Howard Memorandum, supra note 46 (providing guidance for the
continued use of prosecutorial discretion); Memorandum from Julic Myers, Assist.
Sec'y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Dep't of Homeland Sec., to All Field
Office Directors, All Special Agents, on Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion (Nov. 7,
2007) [hercinafter Myers Memorandum] (illustrating the continued use of
prosecutorial
discretion
in immigration
management after the
Meissner
memorandum).

48. See Howard Memorandum, supra note 46, at *4 (encouraging prosecutorial
discretion in sympathetic cases such as "where the alien has a citizen child with a
serious medical condition"); Myers Memorandum, supra note 47. at *1 (providing the
exampie of nursing mothers as a situaion requiring discretion).
49. See. e.g:, Howard Memorandum, supra note 46, at *2-3 (explaining generally
the various stages where ICE agents could exercise discretion to grant relief after
arrest""); Myers Memorandum, supra note 47 (reaffirming the use of prosecutorial
discretion to afford relief from the assertion of the full force of immigration law at the
immigrain enforccment stage).
50 . See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (reiterating the use of
prosecutorial discretion and continued administration of memoranda for guidelines
for its exercise); see also Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Dep't of Homeland Sec.. to All Field Office Directors, on
Enforcing Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Einforcement
Priorities for thc Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens, at *1 (June 17,
2011), available at http://wwW.ice.gov/doclib/Secturc-coilmunitics/pdf /prosecutorialdiscretion-memo.pdf [hereinafter Morton, Civil Memorandum] (discussing how this
memorandum builds on existing memoranda regarding prosecutorial discretion).

51. See Morton, Civil Memorandum. supra note 60, at *2 (providing a list of factors
and situations that aid in the determination of grants of favorable discretion); see also
Memorandum from John Morton. Dir., Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Dep't
of Homeland Sec.,

to All Ficid Officers, All Special Agents in Charge, All Chief

Counsel, on Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs, at *2
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factors that indicated an individual was not a threat to the
United States, allowing the Department of Human Services

("DHS") to decline using the full scope of its removal powers?2
The Morton memoranda streamlined the agency goals
articulated in past memoranda, and helped ICE agents make
enforcement decisions on an individualized basis.53 Additionally,
the Morton memoranda provided for the exercise of categorical
prosecutorial discretion, as the memoranda also included
categories of individuals eligible for discretionary relief.
An analysis of prosecutorial discretion in US immigration
over time reveals it has been exercised both at the micro-level,
indicated by the litany of internal guidance for the assessment of
individual cases, and at the categorical, or macro-level 5 While
immigration officials were usually instructed to exercise
prosecutorial discretion on a case-by-case basis, there have been
instances where broader classes of undocumented immigrants
were designated for discretionary relief. For example, from
(June
17,
2011).
available
at
http:,/www.ice.gov/doclib/secuirecommunities/ pdf/ domestic-violence.pdf [hereinafter Morton, Certain Victims]
(discussing how victims, witnesses, and plaintiffs of certain crimes should be afforded
discretionary relief in order to pursue
and aid in an investigation).
52. See Morton, Civil Memorandum, supra note 60 at *2, (allowing Department of
Human Services ("DHS") personnel to make arrest, detention and removal decisions
based on enforcement priorities and DHS resources); see also Mary Kenney, Legal
Action Ctr., American Immigration Council, PROSECUTORIA LI)ISCRFTTON: HOW TO
ADVOCATE FOR YOUR CLENT at *2-4 (June 24, 2011) (outlining the Morton
memoranda and summarizing the different factors that point to a favorable grant of
discretionary relief).
53. See Wadhia, Mlorton Memo, supra note 42, at *4 (discussing how the Morton
memoranda seek to srean-line all pre-existing memorandum on prosecutorial
discretion through a large list of favorable factors for relief); see also Morton, Civil
Memorandum, supra note 60 (offering a long, analgamated list of factors to guide the
exercise of prosecutoirial discretion in immigration law enforcemilnt).
54. See Morton, Certain Victims, supranote 61 (reminding ICE agents and officials
that discretionary relief should be made on a case-by-case basis. but still articulating
classes of individuals categorized for particular attention); VWadhia. Mlorton Meno, supra
note 42, at *6 ("The Morton Memo on P'rosecutorial Discretion also identifies classes of
persons who warrant 'particular care' when making prosecutorial decisions.").
55. See MOTOMILRA, supra nott 6, at *2 (indicating that decisions made adhering
to the Morton memoranda are indicative of micro-level prosecutorial discretion);
Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra notc al at 246 (discussing categorical and
individual level prosecutorial discretion).
56. See MANUEL & GARVEY, supra note 7, atl2-13 (2013) (discussing that while
guidance on prosecutorial discretion indicated it should be exercised on a case-by-case
basis, some categories of individuals for relief have also been designated). Compare
Napolitano, DACA Memorandum, supra note 3 (explaining the broad category of
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1960 through 1990 the executive branch granted discretionary
relief to certain groups of foreign nationals through extended
voluntary departure, which offered blanket relief from removal
to a particular country.?7
Aside from deferring deportation for groups of foreign
nationals of the same country, the US executive branch has
identified other categories eligible for discretionary relief.5 8 For
example, during the George W. Bush administration, DHS
instructed ICE officers to use discretion when they initiated
administrative arrests of undocumented immigrants that were
nursing infants. 69 Furthermore, DHS also categorized
undocumented immigrants serving in the US military as a group
eligible for discretionary relief from certain provisions of
immigration law.cO Vhile military service was not a dispositive

individuals all eligible for discretionary relief from deportation), with VWadhia, Morton
Memo. supra note 41, at *1 (discussing the "nonpriority" program which identified
factors to determine discretionary relief on an individualized basis).
57. See Oversight Hearing on Issues Arising From Past Designations of Temporary
Protected Status and Fraud in Prior Amnesty Programs Before the H. Subcomm. on
Immigration & Claims of thc H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 106 Cong. (Mar. 4, 1999)
(testimony of Mark Krikorian. Executive Dir.. Ctr. for Immigration Studics) availableat
http://judiciary .house.gov/legacy/ I06-53.htm (explaining various instances where the
Attorney General exercised prosecutorial discretion to grant extended voluntary
departure, and after 1990 deferred enforced departure. to nationals of different
countries); see also MANUEL & GARTY, supra note 7, at 12-13 (discussing extended
voluntary departuire as a means for exercising favorable grants of discretion and how
this was categorical prosecutorial discretion);
58. See. e.g., Memorandum from Marcy M. Forman, Acting Dir., Office of
Investigations, Dep't of Homeland Sec.. to All Special Agents in Charge, on Issuance of
Notices to Appear, Administrative Orders of Removal, or Reinstatement of a Final
Order of Removal on Aliens with United States Military Service, at *1 (June 21, 2004),
available at http://www.legalactioncent e.org/sites/dcfault/files/docs/lac/Foriman2004-incino.pdf [hereinafter Forman Memorandum] (providing guidance for
discretion when issuing notices to appear and removal orders to an undocumented
immigrant who served in the US military); Myers Memorandum, supra note 47
(explaining the categorical approach for exercising discreition when deciding to make
administrative arrests or custody determinations in cases regarding undocumented,
nursing mothiers); see also Kenney, supra note 62, at *10 (discussing categorical
discretion exercised when assessing undocumented nursing mothers and aliens in the
US military).
59. See Myers Memorandum, supra note 47 and accompanying text (delineating
thc parameters of this categorical enforcement policy); see also Kenney, supra note 61
(discussing internal guidance on exercising discretion when confronted with this
category of undocumented immigrants).
60. See Forman Memorandum, supra note 60 (setting forth miliairy service as an
important factor when assessing an individual case); see also Kenney, supra note 62, at
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factor, ICE agents were required to inquire about military
service to guide their enforcement of immigration law."
The Obama administration has also exercised categorical
prosecutorial discretion before DACA, to defer action against
foreign-born spouses and children of deceased US citizens
present in the United States.62 This allowed an entire class of
individuals to avoid removal from the United States. This
policy, and DACA, exemplifies the Obama administration's
willingness to exercise wide-scale categorical prosecutorial
discretion, and micro-level prosecutorial discretion to grant
relief to undocumented immigrants.64
1. The Mechanics of DACA as an Example of Categorical
Prosecutorial Discretion
Immigration officials are allowed a "broad range of
discretionary enforcement decisions" at both the enforcement
and adjudicatory stages of removal proceedings.65 In the field,
2-3, 10 (noting that internal guidance requires ICE agents to exercise discretion if the
undoctuncnted immigrant, or their immediate family, served in the US military).
61. See Forman Memorandum, supra note 60, at *1 (indicating that ICE agents
should inquire about military service, weigh this factor, and report this if a notice to
appear or removal order is ultimately filed); Kenne,

sup a note 62 and accompanying

text (explaining the Forman Memorandum).
62. See Wadhia. Prosecutoral Discretion, supra note al, at 263-64 (explaining the
Obama administration's widowed spouses policy for discretionary relief); see also Press
Recase, US Dep't of Homeland Sec., DHS Establishes Interim Relief for Widows of US
Citizens (June 9, 2009), avaiable at http://www.dhs.gov/nevs/2009/06/09/dhsestablishes-interim-reliefwidows -us-citizens [hereinafter Press Release, DHS Interim
Relief for 'Widows] (establishes foreign national widows with deceased citizen-spouses
to be a category for discretionary relief).
63. See Press Release, DHS Interim Relief for 'Widows, supra note 61 (setting forth
that this class of individuals with specific similar characteristics would not be subject to
removal from the United States); see also press Release, LUSDep't of Homeland Sec.,
Secretary Napolitano and USCIS Director Mayorkas Announce Full Implementation of
New Law Providing Permanent Residence Eligibility for Surviving Spouses and
Children of LUSCitizens (Dec. 14, 2009), available at http:,// wy.dhs.gov/news/2009/
12/14/full-implementation-new-law -providing-perimancnt-residence-cligibility-surviving
(explaining this categorical, blanket policy exercised with respect to this distinct group
of undocumented immigrants).
64. See supra notes 2, 50, 61 (outlining the individualized discretionary decisionmaking provided by the Morton memoranda as well as the broad-scale categorical
enforcement policies implemented during this administration).
65. See, e.g., Morton, Civil Memorandum, supra note 60, at 2-3 (discussing that
ICE agents exercise discretion when "deciding to issue or cancel a notice of detaincr;

deciding to issue, reissue, serve,

ile, or cancel a notice to appear; focusing
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DHS agents may exercise prosecutorial discretion by granting
individuals an administrative stay of removal, or deferred
action.6@ Administrative stays of removal allow ICE agents to
delay, or suspend removal proceedings pending before an
immigration judge.67
Deferred action prioritizes certain classes of undocumented
immigrants for removal to conserve agency resources or to keep
witnesses in the country for assistance during court
proceedings.68 The policy allows DHS agents to choose not to
arrest, detain, prosecute, or remove an undocumented
immigrant for a specified time period.69
Agents grant deferred action based on DHS enforcement
priorities and policies that synthesize factors like national
security concerns, the criminal history of undocumented
immigrants, the likelihood of removal, sympathetic factors, and
the needs and interests of other executive agencies.70 These
enforcement resources on particular administrative violations and conduct; deciding
whom to stop, question, or arrest on an administrative violation; deciding whom to
detain or release on bond, supervision, personal recognizance, or other condition; and
by seeking expedited removal or other forms of removal other than formal removal

proceedings"); see also Neuman, supra note 35, at 616 (discussing how discretionary
decision-making occurs at the enforcement phase when immigration officials decide to
initiate proceedings, and the adjudicatory stage when immigration officials. or a court
decides to stay a removal).
66.

See TOOLKIT FOR PROSECUTORS, supra note 20, at *4 (explaining deferred

action and administrative stays of removal as means for providing discretionary relief);
see also Morton, Civil Memorandun, supra note 49, at *3 (listing deferred action and

staying an action as a means of exercising prosecutorial discretion).
67.

See TOOL.KIT

FOR

PROSECUTORS,

supra

note

20,

at

*6-7

(explaining

administrative stays of removal); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1241.6 (2012) (granting DHS agents
the ability to stay a removal proceeding or order of deportation).
68. See TOOL1KIT FOR PROSECUTORS, supra note 20, at *4 (explaining deferred
action and its purpose): see also Morton, Civil Memorandum, supra note 49, at *3
(listing deferred action as a way to meet agency enforcement priorities and conserve
resources).

69. See TOOLKIT FOR PROSECUTORS, supra note 21, at *6 (explaining that deferred
action is granted "for a specific period of time that ICE determines to be
appropriate"); see also Wadhia, ProsecutorialDiscretion, supra note al, at 263 ("Deferred
action is generally an act of prosecutorial discretion to suspend removal proceedings
against a particular individual or group of individuals for a specific timeframe; it
cannot resolve an individual's underlying immigration status.") (quoting Press Release,
Dep't of Homeland Sec.. DHS Establishes Relief for Widows of U. S. Citizens (June 9,
2009), available at http: //ww.dhs.gov/ynews /releases/pr 124457841250 1.shtm).
70. See TOOLKIT FOR PROSECUTORS, supra note 21, at *5 ("ICE considers DA
requests based on a

variety of factors and balances those interests agamnst its core

mission to remove persons illegally present in the United States. ICE's decision to grant
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policies then guide agent encounters with low-priority
undocumented immigrants at various stages of the enforcement
process.7 1 Additionally, deferred action can be used to grant
relief to broad categories of undocumented immigrants.7 2
DACA is a recent example of deferred action granted via
categorical, macro-level prosecutorial discretion. 7 DACA is
somewhat similar to Congress's DREAM Act. 7 Under DACA,
ICE agents must first determine whether a young,
undocumented immigrant meets certain criteria, and once this
is determined, may defer removal action for two years with the
possibility of extension.7 5 An ICE agent may grant deferred
action under DACA if an individual:
[I]s under the age of thirty;

came to the United States under the age of sixteen;
has continuously resided in the United States for at least five
years, and was in the United States when the DACA
memorandum was issued;

is currently in school, has obtained a high school diploma
or educational equivalent, or is an honorably discharged

veteran: and
DA is purely discretionary."); see also Morton, Civil Memorandum, supra note 60 (listing
the factors balanced to determine if an individual should be afforded relief from the
full freight of immigration law).
71 . See, e.g., Napolitano, DACA Memorandum, supra note 3 (guiding the
implementation of this categorical enforcement policy); Morton. Civil Memorandum,
supra note 49 (guiding the exercise of discretion in individual cases).
72. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., US Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Dep't of Homeland Sec.. to All Employees (une 15, 2012), available at
http:/,/vwT.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pd /sl-certain-young-peoplenorton.pdf (explaining how ICE agents are tasked with applying the DHS Secretary's
enforcement policy to provide discretionary relief to all eligible recipients in the field);
see also Wadhia. ProsecutorialDiscretion,supra note al, at 263 ("More recently, deferred
action has been applied at a macro-level.").
73. Compare Napolitano. DA(A Memorandum, supra note 3 (granting deferred
action to DACA recipients), with MOTOMU RA, supra note 6, at 2 (explaining the
differences between macro-level and micro-level discretion).
74 . See S. 3992, 111th Cong. (2010) (providing relief to undocumented
immigrants that came to the United States as children wvas part of this bill); see also
Fifield & Shanahan, supra note 13 ("President Barack Obana said in June that he was
taking the initiative because Congress had failed to pass the 'Dream Act' that would
create a path to citizenship for young illegal immigrants . . . .").
75. See Napolitano, DA(A Memorandum, supra note 3 (delincating the criteria to
be part of the category defined by DACA and noting tLha, for those meeting the
criteria, deferred action may be renewed after two years).
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has not committed a felony, a serious misdemeanor,
multiple misdemeanors, or pose a threat to national
security.76

DACA thus grants deferred action to an entire category of
individuals meeting these criteria.77
2. Recent Affirmation of Prosecutorial Discretion in
Immigration Law: Arizona v. United States
The Supreme Court's 2012 decision in Arizona v. United
States examined the federalism tensions that prosecutorial
discretion can create and reinforcing the unique role discretion
plays in the context of immigration.7' In the case, the Supreme
Court addressed the constitutionality of Arizona law S.B. 1070, a
state law that attempted to regulate illegal immigration within its
borders.79 The Supreme Court determined the constitutionality
of four provisions of the law.80 Two of these provisions created
new state offenses for violations of immigration law, while the
others gave law enforcement officers enhanced arrest authority
and investigative responsibility with respect to certain
immigrants.,'
In general, the federal law preempts state law where: (1)
the state law regulates an area of law within the exclusive
governance of Congress, or where (2) state and federal law are
76. See id. (delineating the criteria for DACA eligibility); see also President Obarna,
Speech on Immigration, supra note 1 (presenting the criteria to identify this category
of individuals as low-priority for removal).
77. See S. 3992, 111th Cong. (2010) (explaining the parameters of DA(A).
78. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. CL. 2492. 2506 (2012) (indicating that one
issue with S.H. 1070 was its encroachment on the executive branch's discretion in
immigration enforcment); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr.. Arizona v. United States: The
Unitary Executive's Enforcement Disc etion as a Limit on Federalism, (ATO SUP. CT. RLV.
190, 195 (2012) (discussing the Arizona's interpretation of the President's ability to
suppress more exacting stat enforcenit policy).

79. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2497 ("Its stated purpose is to
'discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity
by persons unlawfully present in the United States.'"): see also Hills, supra note 77, at
190 ("At issue in Arizona was ... [a state] statute ... authorizing or requiring state and
local law enforcement officials to arrest, detain for questioning, or impose statedefined penalties on persons . . . .").
80. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. CL. at 2497-98 (citing the provisions of S.B.
1070 considered by and struck down by the Court).
81. See id. at 2497 (explaining the provisions of S.B. 1070 struck down by the
Court); see also Hills, supra note 78, at 192-93 (explaining the provisions of S.B. 1070
considered and struck down by the Court).
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in conflict and compliance with both laws would be impossible.8 2
The Supreme Court ruled that federal law preempted three of
S.B. 1070's provisions, leaving only one of the challenged
provisions standing because its effect on federal immigration law
could not yet be determined"3 This provision allowed state law
enforcement officials to stop and inquire about an individual's
immigration status upon "reasonable suspicion" that the
individual was illegally in the United States.84
Arizona v. United States enabled the Supreme Court to
address the role of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law. 85
Before assessing the provision of S.B. 1070, the Court discussed
federal statutory supremacy over state statutes, and the necessity
of executive discretion in immigration enforcement. 86 The
Court explained that agency discretion allows the executive
branch to decide when to enforce the full extent of the law,
provides flexibility to respond to human concerns, and allows
policies that reflect international relations concerns.' 7
The Court's holding suggests that prosecutorial discretion
is important in immigration enforcement, regardless of
Arizona's significant interest in curbing illegal immigration8
82. See Arizona v. U nited States, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (explaining federal preemption
law where federal and state law were in conflict); see also KATE M. MANUEL & MICHAEL
JOHN GARCIA. CONG. RLSLARCH SERV., R42719, ARIZONA V. UNITLD STATLS:A LIMITLD
RoLE FOR STATES IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 3-4 (2012),
available at

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42719.pdf

(examining

federal

preemption

doctrine).

83. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 25 10 (holding S.B. 1070 sections 3,
5(C), and 6 were preempted by federal law while upholding section 2(B)).
84. See id. at 2507 (discussing how Section 2(B) requires state officers to
determine the immigration status of those they stop, detain or arrest if they reasonably
suspect the person is illegally present in the United States).
85. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. CA. at 2499. 2507 (discussing the importance
of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law and its relevance in the Court's analysis
of section 6); see also Bruno Memorandum, supra note 40, at 13 (explaining how the
Arizona Court arguably affirmed the executive's ability to avoid removal and noted the

importance of discretionary relief).
86 . See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2499-2500 (establishing the
background legal principles of federalism and discretion before assessing the
constitutionality of S.B. 1070).
87. See id. at 2499; see also Bruno Memorandum, supra note 41, at *13 (recognizing
how prosecutorial discretion may "reflect immediate human concerns" like being born
in the United States and having ties to the community, as well as policy concerns).
88. See Arizona v. hited States, 132 S. CL. at 2503, 2505-06 (discussing how section
3 and section 6 of S.B. 1070 would impede agency discretion in the enforcement of the

law, and frustrates federal enforcement policies, despite Arizona's interest in stopping
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The Court struck down most of this state law because it would
have undermined the effective exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in immigration enforcement. " Thus, this case
explores the tension that prosecutorial discretion can cause
between the executive branch and the states."
C. Canada:A Similar FederalSystem's Exercise ofProsecutorial
Discretion in Immigration Law
Immigration law in the United States and Canada is ripe for
comparison, as both are multicultural societies with liberal
immigration policiesP' The two countries neighbor each other,
and both function as federal systems. 2 Key differences exist
however in each country's overall concept of immigration law, as
well as in each country's exercise of prosecutorial discretion to

illegal immigration); see also Hills, supra note 78, at 199 (" [P] rotecting the president's
enforcement discretion formed the heart of Arizona's preemption of Section 6's
authorization of warrantiss arrests.").

89. See Arizona v. Unitd States, 132 S. Ct. at 2505-06 (discussing how section 6
should be preempted because federal agencies are guided by the ICE Memorandum of
John Morton when making removal decisions. and section 6 would give state officials
greater authority to remove than the guidelines offered to federal officers); see also
Press Relcase, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Napolitano on the
Supreme Court's Ruling on Arizona v.
United States (June 25, 2012),
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/06/25/statement-secretar-napolitano-supremecourt's-ruling -arizona-v-united-states

(recognizing that the Supreme Court's holding

"confirmed that state laws cannot dictate the federal goverinmnt's immigration
enforcement policies or priorities").
90. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (addressing the credence given
to prosecutorial discretion by the Arizona Court and the consideration of this in

evaluating whether sections of a state law were preempted).
91. See Steve de Eyre, The Prospects For a North American Security Perimeter:
Coordination and Harmonization of United States and Canadian hmnigration and Refugee
Lawvs, 35 CAN.-U.S 1.J. 181, 185 (2011) (discussing the liberal immigration policies in
the United States and Canada); see also Georgc Jordan Ashk:a, Oh Canada!We Stand on
Guard for Thee: Bill C-50 and the Negative Impact It "MVay" Have on Immigrant Hopes,
Immnigration Objectivity, and the Immigration and Rejugee Protection Act oj 2002, 17 Sw. .
INT'L L. 101, 103 (2011) ("As one of the world's major immigrant receiving countries,
Canada is a leader in granting newcomers the full range of rights and responsibilities
that come with citizenship.").
92. See Canada's System of Government, Gov'T O'F (AN., http://www.canada.ge.ca/
aboutgov-ausujctgouv/structure/mcnu-eng.htmi
(last modified Dec. 5
2011)
(explaining the general federal structure of government in Canada); Citizenship and
immigration Canada, Discover Canada, Gov'T OF A(N., http://www.cic.gc.ca/cnglish/
resource s/ publicaioln s/discover/section-08.asp (last modified Apr. 11, 2012) (citing
the government structure and sources of government power in Canada).
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grant undocumented immigrants relief." Generally speaking, a
prevailing view of immigration in Canada is that it fosters
multiculturalism and adds positive economic value to the
country. 94 Canadian immigration officials see immigration as
nation building and focuses immigration policies on attracting
young, skilled immigrants for economic purposes. 95This is
achieved by an admissions points system, which evaluates
potential immigrants based on various factors that accrue
"points" for entry, such as the type of employment an individual
will seek in Canada.96 Once accepted, immigrants are welcomed
into Canada and provided with a host of federal and provincial
resources, such as language training. 7
The Canadian federal government also allows the various
provinces to nominate, or seek to attract, certain categories of

93. See 1mmigration: The United States v. Canada, ECONOMIST (May 20, 2011, 3:39
PM) [hereinafter ECONOMIST, IMMIGRATION], http://www.economist.con/blogs/
democracyiname rica/2011/05/iimmigration
(explaining how
Canadians
view
immigration as a means of population and nation-building); see also Genevieve Cartier,
The Baker Effect: A New Interface Between the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
and Administrative Law-the Case of Discretion 61. 81-83, in THE UNITY OF PUBLIC LAW,
(David Dzyenhaus ed., 2004) (discussing the individualized approach the
administative branch takes when assessing whether to grant an immigrant
discretionary relief).
94. See ECONOMIST, IMMIGRATION, supra note 93 (explaining how Canadians view
iimigration as a mcans of population and nation-building); see also CATHERINE
DALVERGNE, HUMANITARIANISM. IDENTITY, AND NATIoN: MIGRATION LAws IN CANADA
AND AUSTRATIA 12, (2005) (discussing how in Canada migration has been used to
increase the population generally and in specific parts of the country to benefit the
economy).

95. See ECONOMIST, IMMIGRATION, supra note 93 (explaining the goal of nationbuilding guiding Canadian immigration policy); Tobi Cohen, Canada To Admit 1,000
Fewer Newcomer
on Humanitarian Grounds. CANADA.COM
(Nov. 5, 2012),
http://o.canada.com/2012/11/05/144180/#.USxd/OvSMWI
(explaining how the
Canadian government ensures that the imnmigration system attracts skilled workers
required by labor market).
96. See Steve de Eyre, supra note 91, at 18586 (explaining the points system for
entry into Canada); see also F. Leslic Scidle, Intergover mental InnigrationAgreements and
Public Accountability,. POLY OPTIONS, July-Aug. 2010. at 51, available at
http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/jul I0/seidle.pdf (exploring the employment focused
admission policies in Canada that guide the conception of immigration).
97. See Scidle, supra note 96, at 51 (discussing the various programs and the
provincial governments fund to help fully integrate immigrants into the country); see
also Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Inmigrant Services in Your Area, GOVT OF
CANADA. hIt: //www.cic.gc.ca/cnglish/newcomers/ map/scivices.asp (citing language
assessments and classes as a free service for new immigrants to Canada).
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individuals, for both economic and non-economic purposes."
This further demonstrates the shared decision-making between

the provincial and federal governments regarding immigration
into Canada." Additionally, the Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration Services sets the number of individuals that can
legally
immigrate
to Canada
for humanitarian
and
compassionate, or public policy reasons. 1oo Therefore, the
Canadian federal government and the provincial governments
share decision-making about admissions policies and create
categories of immigrants for legal admission and immigration to
Canada.""
Aside from
these
front-end
admissions
policies,
immigration officials in Canada also exercise prosecutorial
discretion,
primarily on the micro-level through an

98. See Scidle, supra note 96, at 50-51 (explaining the points system and how
categories of individuals considered for entry are developed); Citizenship and
Immigration Canada, Provincial Nominees, Go'T OF CANADA, http:/,/wwy.cic.gc.ca/
english/immigrate/provincial/index.asp (last modified Oct. 22, 2012) (explaining how
the Provincial Nominee Program allows the provinces to determine the types of
immigrants needed in a specific area for economic advancement, which is then
considered when the federal government sets immigration goals).
99. See Seidle, supra note 96, at 49 (noting the concurrent jurisdiction between
the federal and provincial governments regarding immigration): see also Gov't of
Canada Privy Council Office, The Constitutional Distribution of Irnmigration Powers,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS,
http://mm.pco-bcp .gc.ca/aia/index.asplang=eng
(follow "Intergovernmental Affairs" hyperlink under "Quick Links"; then follow
"Canadian Federalism" hyperlink; then follow "Distribution of Legislative Powers"
hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 23, 2012) (explaining concurrentjurisdiction in Canadian
immigration).
100. See Ashkar, supra note 90, at 113 (discussing how the Minister can Set the
number of individuals admitted into Canada each year, including those applying for
relief on humanitarian or compassionate grounds); (Cohen, supra note 94 (" [O]fficials
say they've actually re-jigged their catcgories this year and that Canada will admit about
1,000 fewer newcomers on humanitarian and compassionate grounds."); See also
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Government of Canada's Immigration Planning
Story, GOV'T OF CANADA, [hereinafter Canadas lmigration Planning Story].
http:,//m .cic.gc.ca/english/department/ips/operational.asp (last modified Mar. 2,
2012) (explaining how immigration to Canada is planned by the federal government to
Set categories of individuals for admission befoirc immigrants are granted entry).
101 . See Canada's Inmigration Planning Stoy, supra note 100 (explaining
catcgorical parameters set by Canada regai ding who will be admitted into Canada cach
year, with the majority of immigration classes admitted falling within the economic
category); Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Immigrae to Canada, GOV'T OF
CANADA, http://wwW.cic.gc.ca/english/immnigratc/index.asp (last modified Jan. 8,
2013)

(indicaLing how Citizenship and Immigration Canada creates categorics for

admittance).
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individualized case-by-case review.1 o2 Discretion is individually
exercised when humanitarian and compassionate concerns, or
public policy warrants relieving a specific individual from
removal. 13 Primary adherence to case-by-case micro-level
prosecutorial discretion may be a function of continued
deference to the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Baker v.
04
Canada.1
The Baker decision required immigration officials to
grant relief from immigration law based on an individual's
specific circumstances, implying that discretion should be
exercised at the micro-level. 0 Thus, prosecutorial discretion in
Canada is likened to a dialogue between an immigration official
that is able to grant discretionary relief and the undocumented
individual about why the individual should not be deported
from Canada. 106

102. See Cartier, supra note 93, at 81-83 (discussing the individualized approach
the administrative branch takes when assessing whether to grant an immigrant
discretionary relief); see also Baker v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 ((an.) (explaining
that an officer must make an individualized determination); Dauvergne, supra note 93,
at 160, 162 n.128 (noting how "decisions about humanitarian and compassionate
consideration ... are made almost entirely on a case-by-case discretionary basis," even
though identity categories were used prior to 1997).
103. See DAUVERGNE, supra note 94, at 160-62 (discussing the case-by-case
individualized approach taken to assessing a case on humanitarian and compassionate
grounds, or for public policy reasons); see also Cartier, supra note 93 (identifying the
individualized consideration necessary for evaluating cases for discretionary relief).
104. See Carrier,supra note 93, at 81-83 (explaining the Bakerdecision and how its
individualized approach to discretionary relief from the immigration laws is still
followed despite the court interpreting past lkgislation); see also Baker v. Canada,
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, ((an.) (holding that an applicant for discretionary relief from
deportation proceedings must have the individual factors of his or her case considered
by an immigration official).
105. See Cartier. supa note 93, at 83 (" [Baker] shifts the emphasis from the nature
of the power to the consequences of the exercise of that power on the individual, Baker
requires that discretion be conceived from a new perspective . . . centered on the
individualaffcted by the decision.") (emphasis added); see also TRS Allan, Common Law
Reason and the Limits ofJudicialDeference, in THE UNITY OF PUfBLIC LAw, supra note 92, at
289, 291 (" [TIhe 'dicretionary area of judgment'
..[will be] attuned to the facts of
the particular case; and the court will respect a legitimate governmental purpose in
judging the extent to which the individual must endure its adverse consequences . .")
(emphasis added).
106. See Cartier, supra note 93, at 84 (explaining how the reasonableness of a
discretionary decision is closely linked to the establishment of proper dialogue with the
individual); see also Anna Pratt and Lorne Sossin, A Brief Introduction to the Puzzle of
Discretion, 24 CAN.J.L. & SOC'Y 301, 309 (discussing a dialogue between the decision-

maker and the individual affected by the immigration decision).
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The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act authorizes
Canada's Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration Services and
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to exercise
prosecutorial discretion and exempt undocumented individuals
from provisions of immigration law. 1o7 The Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration Services is primarily responsible
for the administration of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, while the Minister of Emergency Preparedness is
responsible for enforcing the law as it relates to the arrest,
detention, and removal of immigrants."18 The Ministers, or the
immigration officials they supervise, may make discretionary
decisions based on humanitarian and compassionate concerns,
or public policy considerations.109
Undocumented immigrants present in Canada may be
granted exemptions from immigration law on the Minister's
own initiative, or through the individual's application request' Io
In either case, the Minister may exercise discretion to grant an
administrative stay of removal proceedings, or an exemption
from provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
to an otherwise inadmissible immigrant.'
107. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 25(1), 25.1(1),
25.2(1) ((an.) (allowing the Minister. of cither Citizenship and Immigration Services,
or Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, to grant permanent residency status or
exemptions from federal immigration laws); see Toussaint v. Canada, [2011] F.C.A.
1446 ((an.) (holding humanitarian and compassionate

grounds. Or public policy

concerns, warrant discretionary relief).
108. Immigration and Relugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 4(1) (Can.)
(explaining the rol

of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Services); Id. at s.

4(2) (2012) (explaining the role of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness).
109. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 25(1),

25.1(1), 25.2(1) (Can.) (allowing cither Minister to grant permanent residency status
or exemptions from the statute to those that demonstrate humanitarian and
compassionate concerns and public policy considerations); see also Toussaint v. Canada,
[2011] F.C.A. 1446, para. 11 ((an.) (explaining thc Minister's rok in granting
discretionary relief from immigration law).
110. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001 c. 27, s. 25(1), 25.1,
25.2 ((an.) (explaining how individualizes micro-level prosecutorial discretion is
typically exercised in response to a request); see also Immigration and Relugee
Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227. s. 66 (Can.) (explaining how a request for
discretionary relief from immigration law may be made by an undocumented
individual).
111. See immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 25.1(1), s. 50
(Can.); Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227. s. 233

(explaining how Ministers may exercise prosecutorial discretion and grant exemptions
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Typically, if removal from Canada would cause an
individual to face a demonstrable hardship, humanitarian and
compassionate concerns will exist for discretionary relief. 1 2
Ministers or immigration officials usually exercise prosecutorial
discretion where an analysis of the individual's situation shows
removal will cause undeserved, unusual, or disproportionate
hardship. 11 Canadian courts have accepted the synonymy
between humanitarian and compassionate concerns and
individual hardship, and have allowed this to guide the
individualized exercise of prosecutorial discretion.' 4 Hardship is
identified through an analysis of factors such as:
[E]stablishment in Canada;
ties to Canada;
the bests interests of any child affected by removal;
factors in the country of origin;
health or family violence considerations;
separation of relatives; and

friom itmigratLion law or stay a removal resulting from a deporLtation proceeding);
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, ENF 10 Renovals: Enforcement Manuals, GOV'T OF
CANADA (Mar. 31, 2010), http://Nwwk.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/rmanuals/enf/enflOeng.pdf (explaining the process for staying a removal action in Canada).
112 . See BEDIAKO BUAHENE, MOSAIC, A GUIDE To HUMANITARIAN AND
COMPASSIONATF AppiICATIONs 3-5 (2008), available at http:,// wy.accessjustice ca
(ownloads/A Guide to Humanitarian and (CompassionatCApplications.pdf
(discussing hardship, specifically medical hardship, the risk of persecution, and the
best interest of children as main factors considered by Citizenship and immigration

Canada and the Minister of Citizenship and Inmigration); see also Singh v. Canada.
[2009] F.C. 11 (Can.) (analyzing an application for discretionary relief on
humanitarian and compassionate grounds by looking for hardship, and applying the
factors found in IP 5).

113. See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, IP 5 Inmigrant Applications in
Canada MWade on Hunanitarianor CompassionateGrounds, GOV'T OF CANADA, 12-13 (Apr.
4.
2011).
http://www.cic.gc.ca/cnglish/resources/manuals/ip/ipO5-eng.pdf
[hereinafter IP15 Immigrant Applications] (explaining the circumstances that usually
exist when an individual has demonstrated humanitarian and compassionate grounds
for discretionary relief); see also Compassion in Canada's hmigration Program:
Discretionary Relief in Immigration Processing and a Rev iew of the Refugee D(ermination
Process. CANADIAN B. Ass'N ANN. MELTING, Aug. 19, 2009. at 12-14 [hereinafter
CANADIAN BAR Ass'N] (explaining hardship and how it is interpreted when assessing
grounds for discretionary relief).
114. See Singh v. Canada, [2009] F.C. 11 (Can.) (identifying humanitarian and
compassionate

section 25).

grounds

for

exercising

prosecutorial

discretion

pursuant

to

IRPA
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Additionally, the Minister or immigration officer may
consider any other important factor to assess an individual for
1
discretionary relief."
Of these two processes for discretionary relief, prosecutorial
discretion usually is exercised after an undocumented
immigrant submits an application for permanent residency or
exemption from immigration law from within Canada." 7 The
main difference between these applications and a Minister
exercising prosecutorial discretion on his own initiative is that
the submission of an individual's application requires the
Minister or immigration official to consider these factors.1'
HWhen exercising prosecutorial discretion on his own initiative, a
Minister assesses an individual's circumstances by weighing a
combination of these factors, or by choosing not to weigh these
factors at all.119 In Canada, the frequent use of this application

115. See IP 5 immigrant Applications, supra note 113, at *13 (explaining the
circumstances considered when assessing an application for discretionary relief);
CANADIAN BAR ASSN, supra note 113, at *14 (explaining the factors considered when
deterimining whether sufficient humanitarian and compassionate concerns, or public

policy grounds, exist for relief).
116. See IP 5 Immigrant Applications, supra note 113, at *13 (explaining the
individualized assessment of an application for discretionary relief): CANADIAN BAR
ASS'N, supra note 113, at *14 (explaining the individualized process to determine
grounds for granting discretionary relief).
117. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 25(1)
(Can.); Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations SOR/2002-227, s. 66 (Can.);
IP 5 Immigrant Applications, supra note 113, at *10, *21-*22 (demonstrating the
individualized process for granting discretionary relief); CANADIAN BAR Ass'N, supra
note 113, at *10-*12 (discussing how applications for an exemption from the usual
immigration critelria is most frequently invoked by an individual's use of section 25(1)
of IRPA).
118. See Cha v. MCI, [2007] 1 F.C.R. 409 (Can.) (holding that when a Minister
decides to deport an undocumented individual on his own initiative, without an
application, he does not have an obligation to consider all relevant humanitarian and
compassionate circumstances before exercising his prosecutorial discretion); IP1 5
Immigrant Applications, supra note 113, at *13 (discussing how cach case must be
assessed on its own initiative, weighing factors to determine if humanitarian and

compassionate grounds exist to exercise discretion).
119. See Toussaint v. Canada. [2011] F.C.A. 146, paras. 10-11 (Can.) (holding the
proper intLrpreLtation of 25(1) requires the Minister to weigh these factors and then
make a decision regarding the application, as opposed to deciding to exercise
prosecutorial discretion and weigh these factors on his own initiative); CANADIAN BAR
Ass'N, supra note 113, at *6

( quoting Baker v. Canada Minister of Citizenship &

Immigration, [1999] 174 D.L.R. 193 (Can.)) (discussing the Minister's duty to act fairly
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process for discretionary relief from the law, along with Baker's
conception of the proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
indicates that prosecutorial discretion is primarily exercised on
the micro-level.120
11. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN AMERICAN AND
CANADIAN IMMIGRATION- A DACA CASE STUDY
Part II uses DACA as a case study in categorical, macro-level
prosecutorial discretion in the United States, and explains the
issues it has created at the state and agency levels. Although
categorical prosecutorial discretion has been used without such
controversy in the past, Part II addresses DACA's potential for
encroachment on areas of traditional state governance. It also
discusses the intra-agency concerns about granting relief to this
large category of individuals.
Part ILA explores the federalism tension caused by DACA,
through the lens of the state divide over issuing driver's licenses
to DACA recipients. While states have refused to grant DACA
recipients other public benefits, the driver's license debate has
guided the conversation about state sovereignty and state
interpretation of DACA. Next, Part 11.B explores the intraagency tensions that have arisen in response to DACA. Finally,
Part II.C discusses the advantages and disadvantages of primarily
relying on individualized prosecutorial discretion to grant
undocumented immigrants discretionary relief, as in Canada.
A. Federalism Tensions
Before analyzing the federalism tension created by DACA, it
is important to note the advantages that a categorical policy
could have at the state-level. It provides relief to a large number
of undocumented individuals through one executive policy.'
and consider all humanitarian and compassionate circumstances before exercising his
discretion regarding an application pursuant to IRPA section 25(1)).
120. See supra notes 102-06, 114-18 and accompanying text (noting that postBaker prosecutorial discretion was conceptualized as an individualized determination,

which is fuirtheired by the routine submission of individual applications for
discretionary relief requiring case-by-case assessment by immigration officials). C]
MOTOMURA, supra note 6, at *2 (defining micro-level discretion as individualized).
121.

See Preston & Cushman, supra nrote 2, at Al (asserting that 800,000 young

individuals, if eligible, could benefit from this policy).
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From a humanitarian and economic standpoint, this policy
provides a category-wide opportunity for these individuals to

become legal contributors to the country's economy.122 Also, this
policy provides wide-scale relief, without having to wait for
Congressional action.12
1. Arizona, Nebraska, Mississippi and Michigan Treat DACA
Recipients like Immigrants with Unlawful Status
Some states perceive DACA as a broad policy that impedes
state sovereignty. The states fear that DACA implies more than
just

deferred

action

for

beneficiaries,

threatening

state

discretion in the disbursal of public benefits. In response to this
policy, these states quickly reacted to clarify exactly what DACA
recipients should expect from state governments if eligible for
relief from deportation.124
DACA's potential scope, construed to include benefits
beyond federal work authorization, has been met with
opposition from the state governors of Arizona, Nebraska,
Mississippi, Texas, and Michigan because of its perceived threat
to state sovereignty. 25 Following DACA's announcement, these
122. See Napolitano, DACA Memorandum, supra note 3, at *2 (discussing how
immigration laws are not designed to remove productive young peoplc, many of which
have aircady contributed to the country in significant ways).
123. See Memorandum from Denise Vanison, Policy and Strategy, US Citizenship
and Immigration Serys., Dcp't of Homeland Sec'ty, to Alejandro M. Mayorkas, Dir.,
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Scrvs., Dep't of Homeland Sec'ty, on Administrative
Alternatives to Comprehensive Immigration Reform, at *2 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter
Vanison
Memorandum],
http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/memo-onalterinaLives-to-compirehensive-iinigration-reforinm.pdf (discussing the benefits of broad
grants of prosecutorial discretion, namely the ability to relieve a large group of similarly
situated individuals).
124. See President Obama, Speech on Immigration, supra note 1 ("Effective
immediately, the Department of Homeland Security is taking steps to lift the shadow of
deportation from these young people."); Preston and Cushman, supra note 2, at Al
("The policy, while not granting any permanent lkgal status, clears the way for young
illegal immigrants to come out of the shadows, wvork legally, and obtain driver's licenses
and other documcnts they have lacked.").
125 . See James Eng, Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer's Ban on Driver's Licenses for
UIndocanented Imnigrants Likely To Wind Up in Court, NBC NFWS (Aug. 26, 2012),
http: /usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/08/16/13317418-arizona-gov-jan -brewersban-on -drivers-licenses-for-undocumcnted-immigrants-likely-to-wind-up-in-courLtite
(explaining Governor Brewer of Arizona's limiting the potential scope of DACA by
denying recipients licenses); Oosting, supra note 16 (discussing Secretary of State Ruth
Johnson's memorandum telling Michigan employees to not issue drivcr's licenses to
DACA beneficiaries); see also Brewer, Executive Order, supra note 15; Bryant, Executive
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states vowed to deny state benefits to DACA recipients,
specifically driver's licenses.126
Government officials from these states issued executive
orders specifying that DACA recipients are not lawfully present
in the state and thus are ineligible for driver's licenses. 1 For
example, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer authorized state
agencies to block DACA recipients from obtaining state public
benefits or state identification. 128 As a result, the Arizona
Department of Motor Vehicles has changed its policy for issuing
driver's licenses, which included using work authorization for
proof of lawful presence in the United States.' After Governor
Brewer's order, the Arizona Department of Motor Vehicles
removed work authorization from its list of documents for
licensing, which denies DACA recipients a driver's license.,1so

Order, supra note 13 (clarifying the scope of DA(A and Arizona's ability to determine
those eligible for state benefits); Alississippi Governor is Latest to Bar Benefits Jor
LUndocunented
hrigrants,
Fox
NFWs
LATINO
(Aug.
24,
2012),
http:,/latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/08/24/miss-bars-bencfits-fordeferred-status-imrnigrants/ (noting how Nebraska decided not to issue driver's
licenses to DA(A beneficiaries); Press Relcase, Gov. Rick Perry, supra note 8 (denying
to issue driver's license to DA(A beneficiaries in Texas).
126. See .orente, supra note 13 (explaining the state backlash to this policy);
Brewer, Executive OrdCr, supra note 15 (stating Arizona's refusal of driver's licenses to
DACA recipients).

127. See, e.g., Brewer, Executive Order, supra note 15; Bryant, Executive Order,
supra note 15; Sandra Lilicy, Michigan: No Driver's Licenses for Deferred Deportation
Dreamers, NBC NLWS (Nov. 26, 2012), http://nbclatino.com/2012/11/26/michiganno-drivers-Iicenses-for-deferred-deportation-dream ers; (f Press Release, Gov. Rick
Perry, supra note 9.
128. See, e.g., Brewer. Executive Order, supra note 15 (disallowing DA(A
recipients any public benefit otherwise bestowed to those lawiully present in Arizona);
Eng, supra note 125 (explaining how Aiizona views DA(A recipients as both unlawfully
present and with unlawfitl status to support denial of driver's licenses).
129. See Identification Requirements, ARTZONA DEP'T MOTOR VEHICLES, MOTOR
VEHICLE
DIV.,
http://nvd.azdot.gov/mvd/formsandpub/mvd.asp
(follow
"I"
hyperlink: then follow "Identification Requirements" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 17,
2012) (disallowing I)ACA recipients to present work authorization from US Citizenship
and Immigration Services as proof for a driver's license); Karen McNeigh, Undocum)ented
hrnmigrants File Lawsuit Against Arizona Over Denied State IDs, GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/29/immigrants-dream-act-lawvsuitarizona-denied ("Previous to the order, according to the lawsuit. DACA recipients
would have been able to meet the requirements for a driving license by submitting
their employment authorisation documents.").

130. See Lilley, supra note 127 (noting the Arizona Department of Motor Vehicles
changed its list of proper proof of identification as these individuals could use their
newly obtained work authorization to apply for a license under the old policy).
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In defense of their position, these states argue that because
DACA beneficiaries are unlawfully present, instead of without
lawful status, they can refuse to issue driver's licenses.'i These
states argue that being granted deferred action does not provide
an undocumented immigrant with lawful presence in the
country, which they contend the federal government recognized
by allowing them to choose what DACA recipients would receive
within state borders.21 These states view granting state benefits
to DACA recipients as rewarding unlawfully present immigrants
for illegally entering the country, and exposes these states to the
future entry of illegal immigrants at the risk of national
security.'
Additionally, these states cite federal law as support for
their decision to deny state benefits to DACA recipients because
of their unlawful status and presence in the country. 134 Under
US federal law, the states are not required to disburse state
benefits to immigrants who are not considered "qualified
aliens." 1 35 The states may determine how "qualified aliens" can
become eligible for a state benefit, allowing state discretion in
131. See Bryant, Executive Order, supra note 15 (explaining how these individuals
are unlawlully present, and therefore ineligible for state benefits); Eng, supra note 125
(discussing how DHS considered DA(A recipients to be without lawful status but
eligible to remain in the country and avoid deportation).
132. See Napolitano, DACA Memorandum, supra note 3, at *2 (explaining how
DA(A does not change the immigration status or Citizenship of those eligible for
relief); see also Eng, supra note 125 (explaining how Brewer Cited these individuals as
unlawlully present and ineligible for public benefits, citing DHS's assurance that DACA
recipients would not have lawful status as support).
133. See Gosia Wozniacka, Drivers Licenses for tUdocunented Irnrnigrants Could Be a
Big Benefit oj DACA in CalifJrnia, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 15, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/ 09/ 16 /drivers-lice ss-undocunentediLmigrants_n_1888297.htiil (discussing how critics believe that driver's licenses are
"breeder" documents for a host of other documents, as wvell as access to bank accounts,
credit cards, and mortgages); Kathleen Miles, DACA: Driver'sLicenses For LUdocunented
Annigrants
Taries
by
State,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Aug.
20,
2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/20/daca-d-ivers-licenses-n
1811899.htrul?
("Opponents say granting licenses to undocumented individuals would be a national
security risk because license holders can fly and enter buildings.")-.
134. See, e.g., Brewer, Executive Order, supra note 15 (citing that the states'
authority to exclude unlawfully present aliens fromi state benefits is grounds for
denying DA(A beneficiaries driver's licenses); see also 8 U.S.C.
1621(a)-(b), 1622(a)
(2012) (explaining the state discretion in deciding how to disburse benefits, like
licenses, to all those they deein "qualified" aliens).
135. See 8 U.S.C. 1621 (a), (c) (1) (listing professional and commercial licenses as
state benefits under this section).
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determining what "qualified" means.1 6 The states contend that
DACA recipients are not "qualified aliens" under federal law
because they are unlawfully present in the United States, despite
being allowed by the federal government to stay and work.
While these statutes define "qualified" to include those who
have had a deportation withheld, states do not have to consider
DACA recipients as "qualified" for state benefits. 8 According to
this reasoning, the states' actions are defensible under federal
law because they conceptualize DACA recipients as unlawfully
present, and therefore unqualified for state benefits.'
Also, these states argue that they can deny public benefits,
like driver's licenses, because the disbursal of state benefits is
traditionally a state function, and not a power of the federal
government. 140 Issuance of driver's licenses has been considered
powers reserved to the states pursuant to the 10 ' Amendment.141

136. See 8 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (explaining how state benefits may be provided to
qualified" aliens); Kevin R. Johnson, Drivers Licenses and Undocumented Immigrants: The
Future of Civil Rights Law?, 5 NLV. L.J. 213, 228 (2004) (discussing the reasons for
providing undocumented immigrants with licenses and the barriers created by the
federal government's encouragement of state linitations on their issuance).
137. See Brewer, Executive Order, supra note 15 (Citing the unlawful presence as
grounds for denying driver's licenses, and reiterating that DACA does not convey lawlul
status); Bryant, Executive Order, supra note 15 (explaining how unlawfully present
DACA recipients may not receive driver's licenses).
138. See 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (5) (giving states the leeway to determine whether an
alien is "qualified" to be eligible for public benefits conveyed by the state).
139. Compare Brewer. Executive Order, supra note 15, wth Bryant, Executive
Order, supra note 15, with 8 U.S.C.
121, 1641(b) (5) (giving states the ability to deny
state benefits to undocumented immigrants and lkeway in deciding if having a delayed
deportation is considered "qualified"); see Eng, supra note 124 (explaining how
Arizona Governor Brewer used the separate concepts of unlawful presence and
unlawful status as interchangeable terns to justify this policy, whereas DA(A indicates
recipients are without lawful status).
140. See Alexander L. Mounts, A Safer Nation?:How Driver'sLicense Restrictions Hart
humigrants & Noncitizens, Not Terrorists, 37 IND. L. REV. 249-51 (2003) (explaining how
driver's licenses are traditionally thought of as within the province of the states); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectivcly,
or to the people.").
141. See Mounts, supra note 140, at 249-50 (noting how licenses have been within
the powers reserved to the states, which allows the states to dctcriminc eligibility); see
alsoJohison, supra note 136, at 220-21 (recognizing how driver's license scheiics have
been traditionally created and enforced by the states).

1008 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 36:976

Thus, restricting driver's licenses to exclude DACA recipients is
arguably an appropriate, constitutional state prerogative.14 2
2. California and Nevada
State officials in California and Nevada support issuing
driver's licenses and other state benefits to young,
undocumented immigrants.14 California went so far as to pass
its own state version of the DREAM Act. 144 Since DACA,
California state and local legislators have proposed and passed
legislation that allows individuals with deferred action to apply
for driver's licenses.145 These states argue conferring driver's
licenses to DACA recipients ensures public safety, allows DACA
recipients to attend work, and avoids the potential for federal
preemption of policies denying this benefit.14 6
Public safety and everyday necessity are the main reasons
for the states' willingness to convey driver's licenses to DACA
142. See Mounts, supra note 140, at 271-72; johison, supra note 136, at 220-21;see

also Catherine E. Shoichet and Mariano Castillo. Drivers License Rules Fuel New
1mmigration Debate, CNN (Aug. 22, 2012), http://edition.cnn.corn/2012/08/21/us/
stats -immigration-policy/index.html(explaining that drivcr's licenses typically are
within the province of the states, as they set cligibility rules and issuc the document).
143. See Elise Foley, Brian Sandoval Supports Driver's Lenses for Deferred Action
Recipients, HUFINGTON POST (Nov. 29, 2012), http:/,/m .hufiingtonpost.corn/2012
(e xplaining
11/29/ brian-sandoval-dIrivers-licenses-deeirred-action n 2212017.htil
state support for conveying public benefits, specifically driver's licenses, to DACA
recipients); Wozniacka, supra note 133 (stating California's grounds for conveying
driver's licenses to DACA recipients).
144. See Cal. Assembly Bill No. 130, ch. 93 (providing a state version of the
defunct DREAM Act); Cal. Asscnbly Bill No. 131, ch. 604 (explaining the grounds for a
California DREAM Act initiative).

145. See 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. 862 (West) (iled Sept. 30, 2012) (amending
California Vehicle (ode section 12801.6 to allow "any federal document demonstrating
favorable action by thc federal government for acceptance of a person in the deferred
action for childhood arrivals program" to satisfy the requirements for a driver's
license); see also lan Lovett, 1Ds For Illegal Immigrants Take a Step in Los Angeles, N.Y.
TIMLS, Oct. 16, 2012, http:/www.ny times.com/2012/10/17/us/La-takes-step-to-issuingid-cards-to-illegal-imrnigrants.html (explaining the Los Angeles city initiative to provide
driver's licenscs to undocumentecd immigrants).

146. See, e.g., Raymond C. Peck. Unlicensed Driving: A Mtajor California Safety
Problem, CAL. DEP'T OF MOTOR VEHICLES (2011), https://m .dny.ca.go /about/
profile/rd/resnotes/unlicensed.htm (indicating unlicensed drivers or dIrivers with
suspended or revoked licenses wereimuch more likely to be responsible for fatal car
crashes); john Wilderrnuth, Dens Try to Give Young Illegals Licenses, SFGATE (Aug. 23,
2012, 9:04 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Deims-try-to-give-young-illegalslicenses-3808747.php (noting a driver's license would allow undocuiiented immiigrants
to attend and obtain work).
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recipients.147 Unlicensed drivers operating vehicles affects traffic
safety, with undocumented immigrants comprising part of this
unlicensed group. 14s By issuing driver's licenses to DACA
recipients, states will be able train these individuals in driver's
education courses and improve traffic safety. 149 Also, providing
DACA recipients with driver's licenses is a necessity.so These
states recognize that employment depends on being able to
attend work. 151NVithout the mobility a license provides, DACA
recipients may not be able to effectuate the work authorization
granted by the policy and attend work. 5
Finally, by issuing driver's licenses to DACA recipients these
states may escape legal challenge on federal preemption
grounds, avoiding lawsuits like the Arizona case challenging
Governor Brewer's executive order.1 " Denying driver's licenses

147. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (explaining these states recognize
denying DACA recipients driver's licenses causes traffic safety concerns and difficulty
attending to day-to-day activities).
148. See, e.g., SUKiviR S. BRAR, CAL. DEP'T OF MOTOR VHICLES, ESTIMATION OF
FATAL CRASH RATES FOR SU SPENDED/REVOKED AND UNI.CFNSF)
DRIVERS IN
CALIFORNIA, at vi, 2-3 (2012), , -wilable
at http://apps.drn.ca.gov/about/profile/rd/

r_d_rcport/Section_6/S6-238.pdf (correlating undocumented immigrants driving
without a license to fatal car accidents in California); see also Peck, supra note 146
(indicating unlicensed drivers were much more likely to be responsible for fatal car
crashes).
149. See Miles, supra note 133 (discussing how conveying driver's licenses can
increase traffic safety and decrease crashes); see also Man O'Brien, Young Illegal
nmigrants Will Be Eligiblefor California Driver'sLicenses, MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 16, 2012),
http://wNy.mercurynews.com/nation-wvorld/ci 21327328/young-illegal-inmigrantswill-be-cligible-california-drivers (discussing past Democratic movements for licensing
undocumented individuals in California).
150. See Miles, supra note 133 (discussing the importance of driving to take
advantage of work opportunities in California); Wildcrimuth, supra note 155
(explaining how most people depend on a car to get to work and go about daily life).
151. See Wozniacka, supra note 133 (discussing how unlicensed undocumented
immigrants may not be able to gain mcaningful employment due to the lack of
accessible transportation to work); see also Wildcrimuth, supra note 146 and
accompanying text (citing the necessity for driver's licenses in an individuals everyday
life).
152. See Johnson, supra note 136, at 221-22 ("to an undocumented immigrant, a
driver's license means the ability to live in a wvay that most Americans take for
granted"); see also Wozniacka, supra note 133 (discussing how unlicensed
undocumented immigrants drive may not be able to gain employment in most of the
country or wvill be left to take illegitimate work).
153. See Johnson, supra note 136, at 228 (discussing that because the federal
government regulates immigration, " [i]f immigration control is the primary reason for
limiting undocumented immigrant access to driver's licenses, then an issue of federal
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may limit the full recognition of DACA and constitute regulating
immigration, which is typically left to the federal government.1 4
Also, other provisions of US federal law may preempt state
policies denying benefits to those granted deferred action.'86
Thus, by allowing DACA recipients to have driver's licenses
these states avoid litigating this issue, and having their state's
policy preempted.156
B. Intra-Agency Tensions Within the Executive Branch
Irrespective of the following analysis of intra-agency
backlash to DACA, categorical prosecutorial discretion can be
advantageous to the US executive branch. Categorical
prosecutorial discretion allows immigration agents to focus on
dangerous, undocumented immigrants for removal.1 The DHS
has a limited amount of resources to spend in deportation, in
comparison to the number of undocumented immigrants

preemption arises"); Amended Complaint, supra note 17, at 1-3 (citing challenges to
Governor Brewer's executive order on federal preemption grounds).
154. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. CA. 2492, 2501 (2012) (explaining that
federal law preempts state law when state law regulates an area left to the US Congress,
like immigration, or when it limits the effect of a federal law); see also Johnson. spra
note 136, at 228 (explaining that if immigration control is the motivation for denying
licenses then federal preemption issues arise); McVeigh, supra note 129 (explaining
that instead of denying DACA recipients licenses, "our leaders should coie together to
enact long-term solutions that, would allow talented immigrant youth to achieve the
American dream").
155. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2012)
(prescribing specific parameters necessary for state driver's licenses to be recognized
for federal purposes, and listing those eligible for driver's licenses to include deferred
action recipients); see also Eng, supra note 125 ("Cruz noted that the REAL ID Act of
2005, a federal law that modified requirements for state driver's licenses and ID cards,
speciically listed immigrants who have been granted 'deferred action' as among
groups of people eligible for a license. ").
156. See Amended Complaint, supra note 17 (explaining the lawsuit filcd against
Governor Brewer in Arizona); jeremy White, Immigration Policys New Sticking Point:
Drivers' Licenses Fort the Undocum.ented, INT'L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2012),
http://ww,.ibtimes.com /imlmigration-policys-new-sticking-point-drivers-licensesundocumented-754178 ("It now seems likely that the overarching question of what
rights reprieved immigrants [receive] will be haminicred out in court.").
157. See Carol Cratty, Ten ICE Agents Target Obamia Deportation Policy with Lawsuit,
(Aug. 23, 2012), http:/ ww cnn. coin /2012/08/ 23/ us/ ice-agents-lawsuit
CNN
(discussing backlash to the policy that is supposed to allow ICE agents "to focus their
attention on dangerous criminals who are illegal immigriants"); see also LloreilC, supra
note 13 (explaining the Republican and state backlash to DACA).
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present in the United States. 158 Thus, policies like DACA allow
immigration officials to conserve agency resources and focus on
deporting egregious individuals.15 9
1. The ICE Agents Lawsuit
Aside from federalism tensions, DACA has created intraagency conflict within DHS.bO In August 2012, ten ICE agents,
and the state of Mississippi, filed a lawsuit in the Northern
District of Texas against the Secretary of Homeland Security,
Janet Napolitano. 1a The suit attacked DACA specifically, and the
executive branch generally, on their ability to exercise
prosecutorial discretion and provide relief to undocumented
immigrants. 162 The agents claim the US executive branch
disregarded their concerns about DACA and ordered them to
avoid removing a broad class of undocumented immigrants in

158. See Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano Announces
Deferred Action Process for Young People Who Are Low Enforcement Priorities (June
15,
2012).
available
at
http://wmy.ice.gov/news/releases/1206/
120615washingtondc.htm [hereinafter Press Release, Deferred Action] (explaining
DACA allows the DHS to continue focusing its enforcement resources on removing
those posing risk to national security or public safety and deprioritizing othiers); see also
Napolitano. DA(A Memorandum, supra note 3 (explaining additional measures are
necessary to ensure ICE enforcement resources are not expended on low priority
cases).
159. See Press Relcase, Deferred Action, supra note 158 ("Today's action further
enhances the Department's ability to focus on these priority removals."); see also
Napolitano, DACA Memorandum, supra note 3 (identifying that these individuals are
low-priority and that many of these cases already had been closed administratively).
160. See Cratty, supra note 157 ("The complaint ... obects to the policy of
prosecutorial discretion,' in which ICE agents are supposed to focus their attention on
dangerous criminals who are illegal imnigrants."); see also Elise Foley, Kris Kobach
Represents Immigration Agents in Lawsuit Against Obama Adminisation, HiITFINGTON
POST, Aug. 23, 2012, http://ww.huffingtonpost.con/2012/08/23/kris-kobachiminugration-lawsuit-obama n 1825272.html? [hereinafter Foley, Innigation Agents
Lawsuit] (explaining the grounds for the ICE agent suit against DHS).
161. See Amended Complaint, supra note 17, at 1-2 (explaining grounds for thc
ICE agent suit, nanely the agents' belief DA(A preveint agents fron doing their job).
162. See Cratty, supra note 157 ("In a nutshell, the agents do not want to obey the
new policies and do not want to face any disciplinary actions or lawsuits if they continue
to arret .... "); see also Stcphan Dinan, humigration Agents Sue to Stop Obaras NonDepoation Policy, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2012, http:,// wwashingtontimes.com/
("[ICE]
news/2012/aug/23/immigration-agcnts-suc-stop-obamas-non-dcportation
agents and deportation officers said Mr. Obamna's policies

force

them to choose

between enforcing the law ... and violating their own oaths of ofice . . . .").
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violation of the law.16 In the complaint, the agents allege that
this executive action is a violation of the separation of powers, as
it usurps Congress' role in passing immigration reform.14
Furthermore, the plaintiffs cite DACA's breadth and its
ability to offer relief to an entire category of people as support
for the causes of action. 1 65 Within the body of the amended
complaint, one cause of action explicitly alleges that DACA is
illegal because of the enormous group of individuals it will
benefit if they are eligible.' @Two other causes of action cite
DACA's ability to categorically confer discretionary relief to
similarly situated undocumented immigrants.'17
The Department of Homeland Security has defended
DACA in the face of this lawsuit, as well as the legality of the
executive branch's use of prosecutorial discretion to deprioritize
individuals for removal. ' The US executive branch believes
setting enforcement priorities is "well within its power in
enacting policy," providing support for DACA as within the

163. See ICE Agents Sue to Stop Obamas Deferred Deportation Policy, FOX NFWS (Aug.
23, 2012), http://latino.foxnews.con/latiLno/politics/2012/08/23/ice-agents-sue-tostop-obarna-deferred-deportation-policy/
[hereinafter ICE Agents Sue Deferred
Deportation] (discussing the adiinistration's disinterest in working with agents to
address fears over DA(A); see also Niels Lesniewski, Innigration Lawsuit Stirs Up
Congressional,PresidetialPoitc, ROLL CALL (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.rollcall.corn/
ncws/immigration_1awsuitstisrs_up-congressional-presidential-politics-216967-1.htmLi
(discussing how soie view DA(A as amnesty that rewards lawbreakers and forces ICE
agents to break the law).
164. See Lesniewski. supra note 163 (explaining ICE agents believe the Obarna
adninistraton overstepped prescribed bounds into that of the legislative branch); see
also Corey Dade, Immigration Employees File Suit Against Obama's New Immigration Policy,
NPR (Aug. 23, 2012 6:33 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/08/23/
159926481/iinmigration-cmployecs-file-suit-against-obaias-new-imigration-policy
(citing how the executive branch usurps congressional power by allowing DACA).
165. See Amended Complaint, supra note 17, at 16 (explaining federal regulations
do not authorize conferring deferred action to an entire category of unlawfully present
aliens of this size).
166. See id. at 20 (discussing how this policy cannot be kgal because of the
number of individuals eligible for relief).
167. See id. at 20-21 (discussing how this policy cannot be legal because it could
grant deferred action to fifteen percent of all undocumented immigrants).
168. See Dinan, supra note 162 (quoting DHS as defending prioritizing of
individuals for removal with DACA being "a continuation of these priorities"); see also
Foley, humigration Agents Lawsuit, supra note 160 (discussing the Obana
Administration's

belief that DA(A

prosecutorial discretion).

is well within its power

given the

need for
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province of the executive branch.169 This intra-agency lawsuit
over DACA shows how the use of categorical, macro-level
prosecutorial
discretion
can
create
intra-agency
complications.1 70
C. The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Canadian System's
Reliance on Individualized Prosecutorial Discretion
1. Advantages of Individualized Prosecutorial Discretion
Canada's
individualized,
micro-level
exercise
of
prosecutorial discretion has several advantages. First, Canada's
individualized approach does not raise the same federalism
tensions, as immigration policy-making is shared between the
Canadian federal government and provincial governments.1 71
This allows the provincial governments to communicate with the
federal government about immigration policy, and help decide
which types of immigrants to attract to specific provinces for the
economic development of these areas.'17 At the most basic level,
this relationship between the Canadian federal and provincial
governments requires consultation with the provinces regarding
changes to the legal framework of immigration.1 7 This shared
169. See Folcy, humigrationAgents Lawsuit, supra note 160; see also Matt Negrin and
Pierre Thomas, Obamna Dejends Immigration Deportation Rules Criticized as Political, ABC
NEWS (June 15, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics-,/OTUS/obamna-defendsimmigrant-deportation-rules-criticized-political/story?id=16576677#.ULAcsHbUrIg
(discussing how DACA is a logical progression from past valid DHS decisions regarding
undocumcnted immigrants); Dinan, supra note 161 (defending DA(A as part of DHS's
tradition of granting prosecutorial discretion to certain undocumented immigrants).

170. See julia Preston, Agents Sue Over Deportation Suspensions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23,
http://www'.nytimes.com/2012/08/24/us/agents-suc-over-deportation2012,
suspensions.htmil (explaining how the ICE agent suit indicates signs of turmoil within
DHS in response to the Obana Administration's ambitious shift in focus); supra notes
162-67 and accompanying tcxt (explaining the issues raised by DA(A and how it grants
discretionary relicf to an enortmous category of individuals).
171 . See Gov't of Canada Privy Council Office, supra note 99 (explaining
concurriLent jurisdiction in Canadian immigration); see also Scidle, supra note 96, at *4950 (explaining concurrent federalisn in immigration has been exercised by federal
and provincial governments since the late I800s).
'71. See Scidle, supra note 95 (explaining concurrent jurisdiction and its benefits
in immigration policy-making); see also Provincial Nominces, supra note 158.
172. See DAUVERGNE, supra note 94, at 18 (explaining public consultation in
Canada helps the government assert changes in policy and respond to what the nation
wants);

see also Citizenship

and

1Immnigration

Immigration Agreement, GOV'T OF CANADA

Canada,

(2010),

Canada-British

Columbia

http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/
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policy-making has resulted in immigration treaties between each
province and the Canadian federal government.1 74
These treaties evince the shared jurisdiction between the
Canadian federal government and provincial governments, as
they allow the provincial governments to nominate immigrants
and implement federal immigration policies.175 The treaties also
outline the integration programs the province will provide to all
immigrants, administrated and in part offset by federal
funding. 176 Through these treaties, the Canadian federal
government considers the specific costs of immigration to the
provinces, and promotes communication between the federal
and provincial governments about discretionary decisionmaking in the admissibility of immigrants. 177 However, the
treaties give the Canadian federal government the sole
discretion to determine admissibility, despite any shared
immigration policy-making powers.' 78 Thus, these agreements
department/lawvs-policy/agreements/bc/bc-20 IO.asp [hereinafter British Columbia
Agreement] (discussing the duty to consult with provincial governments regarding
immigration).
174. See, e.g., Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Canada-OntarioImmigration
Agreement, GoVT OF CANADA (2005), http://www.cic.gc.ca/cnglish/ department/lawspolicy/ agreements/ ontario/ ont-2005-agree.asp
[hereinafter
Ontario Agreemtent]
(explaining the concurrent policy-making in immigration law); see also See Citizenship
and Immigration Canada, Annual Report to Parliament on hmin-graion 2008, Gov'T OF
CANADA,

http://vwv.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/annual-ireport2008/

section2.asp (last visited Nov. 25. 2012) [hereinafter Annual Report to Parliament]
(discussing the collaboration and communication between the federal, provincial, and
local governments over immigration law and integration programs, and the concurrent
jurisdiction over immigration between these governments).
175. See Scidle, supra note 96, at *50 (discussing concurrent jurisdiction in
Canadian immigration); see also British Columbia Agreenent, supra note 174 (citing the
immigration policies both the province and Canada recognize are of mutual interest.
and delineating the immigration responsibilities of each entity); Ontaio Agreement,
supra note 174 (recognizing the immigration policy responsibilities of each entity).
176. See Scidle, supra note 96, at *51 (discussing the settlement and integration
programs in immigration treaties between provinces and Canada); see also British
Columbia Agreementt, supra note 174 (providing settlement and integration terms)
177. See DAUTRGNF, supra note 94 and accompanying text (explaining the
advantages of shared jurisdiction between the federal and provincial governments in
Canadian immigration); see also, British Columbia Agremenrt, supra note 174 and
accompanying text (determining the tcrms of the agreement between the provincial
and federal government over imnuigration policy).

178 . See, e.g., British Columbia Agreement, supra note 174 (recognizing the
discretion retained by the Canadian federal government in decisions of admissibility or
inadmissibility); Ontario Agreenent, supra note 174 (explaining tre erims of the treaty
and what parts of immigration are retained by the Canadian federal government).
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indicate that the provinces accept the Canadian federal
government's exercise of micro-level prosecutorial discretion,
unlike the US state and agency response to DACA.1 79
2. Disadvantages of Individualized Prosecutorial Discretion
Canada's individualized system of discretionary relief also
comes with disadvantages. The main issue is the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act provisions are broad-the terms
"humanitarian" and "compassionate" are not definedsuggesting that this type of discretionary decision-making is
unstructured and is difficult to supervise.'so This may result in

arbitrary decision-making made at the individual level, and a
lack of consistency across similar cases.'I
This may harm undocumented individuals more than help
them because the immigration official is left to interpret these
broad guidelines and may impose personal biases, despite the
required deliberation over an individual's application. 182
Furthermore,
the determinations in these cases are

179 . See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text (indicating that
communication between the federal and provincial governments and the considerailon
of immigration's costs to the specific provinces creates concurrent jurisdiction allows
for the acceptance of the federal government's exercise of micro-level prosecutorial

discretion).
180. See Lorne Sossin, From NeutIalty to Compassion: The Place of Civil Service Values
and LegaltNorms in the Exercise ofAdmi nistrative Discretion, 55 U. TORONTOILJ. 427, 434
(2005) (explaining Canadian micro-level prosecutorial discretion does not have criteria
for determining humanitarian and compassionate grounds and can be too
unstructured, broad, and difficult to supervise); see also TRS Allan, supra note 104
(explaining the broader the terms of the relevant legal standard for administrative
enforcement the greater the ability for administrative value judgments and expertise in
discretionary decision-making).
181 . See Sossin, supra note 180, at 434-44 (discussing how individualized
prosecutorial discretion may result in inconsistency); see also TRS Allan, supra note 105
(discussing the potential limitations of individualized, case-by-case discretionarv
relief).
182. See MatthCw, J. Hrutkc," Give Ale Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Huddled Masses,"
But Not Your Homosexual Partnrus:InternationalSolutions to Amnericas Same-Sex Immigration
Dilemma, 18 CARDOZOJ. INT'L & ComP. L. 89, 111-12 (2010) (discussing the criticism of
prosecutorial discretion in Canada, through the lens of same-sex immigration, and

how this individualized process for granting discretionary relief may reilect the
immigration officer's own beliefs); see also Sossin, supra note 180, at 435-36 (discussing
the limitations of individualized prosecutorial discretion. including the substitution of

personal beliefs into the decision-making process).
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individualized and do not allow for wide-scale relief to similarly
situated individuals at once.'"

III. RECOMMENDATIONS TO AID IN THE CONTINUED AND
FUTURE USE OF CATEGORICAL PROSECUTORLAL
DISCRETION IN AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
Part III provides recommendations for the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in American immigration law. Part III.A
argues that state communication and participation in
immigration will make categorical prosecutorial discretion seem
less threatening. In Part III.B, this Note asserts that categorical
prosecutorial discretion may be less controversial if the US
executive branch considers the unique disadvantages that
deferred action policies like DACA may have on individual
that intra-agency
states.
Finally, Part III.C suggests
communication and education at the agent-level may limit the
internal backlash to this specific exercise of discretion in the
future.
A. Get the States to Participateand "Buy In" to the Federal
DiscretionaryPolicv
In the implementation of DACA, the US federal
government has not communicated with the states as it did
following the implementation of other reforms in President
Obama's first-term agenda.1 84 While the battle over the Patient
Protection and Affordable Healthcare Act was certainly
contentious, the executive branch chose to communicate with
the states about how best to enforce and implement the new
183. Compare Napolitano, DACA Memorandum, supra note 3 and accompanying
text (determining a category of individuals based on criteria that if met provides

discretionary relief to this immigrant class), with IP 5 Immigrant Applications, supra
note 113, at 12-13 (explaining the individualized assessment of each individual case for
discretionary relief).
184. CompareNegrin & Thomas, supra note 169 (discussing how DA(A was crafted
within DHS and is a logical progression from past DHS decisions regarding
undocumented

immigrants),

with Ricardo Alonso-Saldivar, Obama's Healthcare Law

Advances in the States, ASSOCIATED PRLSS, Nov. 16, 2012,
available at
http://finance.vahoo.con/news/obanas-health-care-law-advances-states-210635811politics.html (discussing the state input and participation in the enforcement and
implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Healthcare Act, such as states

being able to craft their own exchange programs to comply with the new law).
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health care law after the Supreme Court upheld its validity. 8 5 In
contrast, DACA has led to state deliberation over its scope,
making it seem as though DACA does not invite state
participation in its implementation. '86 Opening the lines of
communication with the states about discretionary relief from
deportation, like the Department of Health and Human Services
did to implement the Patient Protection and Affordable
Healthcare Act, may avoid challenges to the future exercise of
categorical prosecutorial discretion.18 7
While the success of the US government's experiment in
state communication remains to be seen, it is similar to the
dialogue between the provincial and federal governments in
Canada used to successfully implement immigration law.188 It
may benefit the US federal government to communicate with
the states over enforcement priorities, especially in the exercise
of categorical prosecutorial discretion where the executive
decision has far-reaching influence.'"1 Therefore, if categorical
185. See Alex Nixon, Pa. Faces Deadlinefor Health Insurance Exchange, PITTSBURGH
TRIB.-REV., Nov. 15, 2012, available at http://triblive.com/business/headlines/295694674/exchange-state-health-insu rance-corbett-pennisylvania-run-states-decisionexchangs#axzz2MLMvelFA (explaining how states are allowed to decide how health
insurance markets and exchanges will be structured, and report this information to the
Department of Health and Human Services); see also Alonso-Saldivar, spra note 183
and accompanying text (discussing how states may decide how to implement portions
of the new law and partner with Washington to build their own exchanges or defer to
the federal plan).
186. Compare Eng, supra note 125 and accompanying text (demonstrating how
states, like Arizona, have attempted to limit the scope of DACA by denying driver's
licenses in response to the 'announcement of this federal enforcement priority), with
Alonso-Saldivar, supra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing state input in the
implementation of the Affordable Healthcare Act by crafting their own exchange
programs to comply with the new law rather than deferring to the federal government's
plans), and Nixon, supra note 185 and accompanying text (highlighting how the new
healthcare law allows states to either partner with the federal government on
exchanges and share enforcement, set up and run their own exchange, or defer to the
federal government's plans).

187. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text (indicating that there could
have been greater communication betwecn the executive branch and the states about
DACA's scope before implementation).
188. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text (explaining the advantages of
Canada's system of concurrlent jurisdiction in immigration law, which allows provinces
to create treaties with the federal government to foster communication about
immigration policy-making and limit provincial backlash to acts of prosecutorial
discretion).
189. See Vanison Memorandum, supra note 123, at 10 (commenting on how

expansive conferrals of deferred action, such as categorical prosecutorial discretion,
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prosecutorial discretion is used in the future, it may behoove the
federal government to communicate with the states and have
9 o
these governments "buy in" to the federal policy.1
B. Have the Executive Branch Consider the Disadvantage of
Deprioritizing Classes ofIndividuals in Certain States
Similarly, the US federal government could still limit
challenges to categorical discretionary enforcement priorities by
taking account of the unique disadvantages some states may
incur from broad conferrals of deferred action, such as a
decrease in available employment for citizens. 191 In Canada, the

provinces are considered, and often consulted, when policy is
made to ensure that the local burdens of federal immigration
policy are understood. 192 This ensures that the provincial
governments accept federal immigration decisions and the
"unique economic, social, and labour market needs of each
province and territory." 1 Perhaps if the US federal government
independently considered the potential disadvantages of widescale discretionary relief on the states, then the US
government's exercise of categorical prosecutorial discretion
may not seem as threatening to the states.194
could be controversial); see also Scidle, supra note 96 and accompanying text
(explaining how the concurrent jurisdiction and communication between the different
levels of government creates successful immigration policy-making in Canada).
190. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text (implying that allowing states
to weigh in on priorities for immigration enforcement before implementation may not
seem as threatening to states).

191. See Llorinte, supra note 13 and accompanying text (explaining that DACA
may have economic, safety, and other associated costs on certain states); see also Fiield
and Shanahan, supra note 14 (discussing the possible disadvantages of DA(A, like job
competition).

192. See Annual Report to Parliament, supra note 174 and accompanying text
(discussing the collaboration and communication between the federal, provincial, and
local governments over immigration law and integration progriams to create
concurrent jurisdiction); see also British Columbia Inmigration Agreement, supra note 174
and accompanying text (considering local concerns in the creation of the treaty terms).
193. Annual Report to Paliamnent, supra note 174, at section 2 (explaining how
provinces are consulted and specilic province-level characteristics are accounted for in
immigration dccision-making); see also British Columbia Inmigration Agreement, supra
note 174 and accompanying text (showing the Canadian government's cognizance of
the specific immigration needs of British Columbia when crafting immigration policy
and its care in delineating areas solely under federal control).
194. See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text (comparing the disadvantages

of categorical prosecutorial discretion that make these policies seem threatening to the
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C. Better Intra-Agency Communication and Education Regarding
ProsecutorialDiscretion and Enforcement Priorities
Finally, the intra-agency issues should be addressed to avoid
dissention
within
DHS
over
categorical
immigration
enforcement priorities.'19 The crux of the ICE agents' lawsuit
against DHS is the perception that DACA forces law
enforcement officials to violate their oaths and federal law, while
also overreaching the separation of powers. 1 ' Most notably, the
ICE agents disagree with the wide-scale relief that will result
from this act of categorical prosecutorial discretion. ' Intraagency fears could be mitigated if ICE agents burdened by a
proposed enforcement policy were given the opportunity to
voice concern before the policy went into effect.2" ICE agents

may feel that a forum to both voice concerns about enforcement
priorities and to interact with higher-ranking administrators
within DHS would ensure that their discomfort in implementing
these policies is taken into consideration.
This additional
process given to ICE agents can function as an internal check on
agency discretion, legitimizing these discretionary enforcement
priorities for agents and the public. 2)) Thus, this
states with the less threatening nature of prosecutorial discretion in Canada's system of
concurrent jurisdiction).
195. See generally supra notes 159-69 and accompanying text (exploring the ICE
agents' lawsuit against DHS and Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano,
over the kgality of DACA).
196. See Anended Complaint, supra note 17, at 2 (explaining each of the causes of
action against DHS and Secretary Napolitano); see also Cratty, supra note 156 and
accompanying text (determining the basic grounds for the ICE lawsuit).
197. See Amendcd Complaint, supra note 17 and accompanying text (citing the
scope of DACA and the number of individuals it has the potential to relieve from
deportation as part of the cause of action in the ICE agents' suit).
198. See Dadc, supra note 164 and accompanying text (explaining how the
administration has been opaque with ICE agents about enforcement policies and have
excluded agent participation and dialogue); N al Kunai
aItyal, Internal Separation of
Pewers: Checking Today's lost agerou Branc Po n
iti n, 115 YALE L J 211, 23 18
(2006) (discussimg how the executive branchca impose modest checks upon itself to
ensure

enforcement

policies advanced

by the presidnt are not the product of

presidenialadvenuturi)
199. See ICE Agents Sue Deferred Deportation, supra note 162 ("Chris Crane, the
president of ICE agents' union who is suing Napolitano and Morton, accused the
Obana administration of ignoring the demands of ICE agents when formulating the
new policy."); see also Dade, supra note 161 (discussing how ICE agents must enforce
this policy or risk suspension, despite the agents being outspoken in opposing DA(A).
200. See Katyal, supra note 198. at 2347 (explaining how modest internal checking
functions like overlapping agency jurisdiction will lead to executive policy legitimacy);
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recommendation would allow for the exercise of categorical
prosecutorial discretion without constant litigation and
dissention within DHS over the propriety of these policies.2 0o
CONCLUSION
The response to DACA's broad conferral of deferred action
has been aggressive at both the state and agency level'.202 While
prosecutorial discretion to deprioritize immigrants has been
used throughout presidential history, DACA has elicited strong
criticism.2 1 Reliance on categorical prosecutorial discretion may
expose future policies to similar challenges on grounds of state
sovereignty and separation of powers.204 In contrast, the exercise
of micro-level, individualized prosecutorial discretion, like that
primarily relied on in Canadian immigration, may not present
the same challenges. h However, primary reliance on microlevel prosecutorial discretion to grant relief is not without
criticism. 2o1 While the US executive branch may prefer to
develop systemic enforcement policies to grant relief to
categories of immigrants without waiting for the US Congress, it
could better accommodate the states and agents affected by
these actions. Thus, accommodation and communication
between these parties could prevent similar backlash every time
categorical prosecutorial discretion is exercised in the future. 07
see alsoJessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards fr Agency Guidance:A Source ofLegitimacy for
the Administrative State, 61 AD\MIN. L. REV. 343, 390 (2009) (explaining the lack of
participation and transparency in the formulation of agency guidance, even among
agency staff. allows public questioning of its legitimacy).
201. See supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text (discussing the legitimacy
DIS agents and the public might feel if DHS allowed its agents to voice their concerns
and check the discretionary decision-making of agency higher-ups).
202. See supra notes 128-30. 162-67 and accompanying text (discussing the state
and agency level response to DACA because of its perceived scope, encroachment on
state sovereignty, and overall legality).
203. See supra notes 122. 154 and accompanying text (explaining the state and
agency backlash toward DACA).
204. See supra notes 128-30, 162-67 and accompanying text (discussing state

government and agency barriers to the use of categorical prosecutorial discretion).
205. See supra notes 170-78 and accompanying text (discussing Canada's use of
nicro-level prosecutorial discretion).
206. See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text (discussing the disadvantages
of relying on micro-level prosecutorial discretion to grant undocumented immigrants
relief).
207.

See supra notes 183-200 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages of

categorical prosecutorial discretion).

